(1.) This application is presented by Dhunmun Singh and others, second party, against an order dated 9 March 1933, declaring the possession of certain property to be with the first party and directing under Section 145, Criminal P.C., the second party to abstain from interference with that possession. An application was presented on 23 March 1933 to the Sessions Judge to refer the matter to the High Court which he rejected on 11 April 1933. The present application was presented on 12 June 1933 more than three months after the order complained of and more than two months after the rejection of the petitioner's application by the Sessions Judge. The rule of practice of this Court is laid down in Kelu Patra v. Iswar Parida AIR 1929 Pat 404 that this Court will not ordinarily interfere in revision on an application presented more than two months after the date of the order complained of.
(2.) The rule is not a rule of law and of course does not take away the power of this Court to interfere in any case as undoubtedly this Court has power to do even of its own motion and in the absence of any application at all on a perusal of the record. The dispute between the parties concerned the estate of one Ramrachya Singh, deceased, and arose on the death on 19 September 1930 of his widow Bhagwati Kumri. The proceeding under Section 145 related to the kutchery house of the estate in village Sakarbasa, The opposite party claim to have succeeded as daughter and daughter's son of the deceased, The petitioners claim as agnates of Ramrachya Singh. Proceedings were started on a report of the Sub-Inspector of Police dated 30 August 1933.
(3.) The Sub-Inspector reported that the opposite party had been in possession in the interval between the conviction of the petitioners by a Magistrate on a charge of rioting and their acquittal on appeal by the Sessions Judge, which acquittal was dated 23 July 1932; but that the petitioners recovered possession on 1 August 1932. The Magistrate, instead of at once drawing up proceedings, passed an order under Section 144 restraining both parties from going on the disputed land, and fixed 16 September 1932 for their appearance, and after certain adjournments, the proceeding under Section 145 was actually drawn upon 27 October 1932. It is contended therefore that on the Sub-Inspector's report and evidence the Magistrate ought to have held that petitioners were in possession from 1 August 1932 and that even if they obtained such possession wrongfully and by force, they could not be removed from possession by an order passed in a proceeding drawn up more than two months after the date on which petitioners forcibly obtained possession.