(1.) The witness, Sub-Inspector Sorabji, states that when he questioned accused No. 2 on September 21 at about twelve noon, she told him about the knife. When questioned as to what were the exact words, so far as he remembered, which were told to him by accused No. 2, he wrote them down from memory. According to him, Shevantibai told him and the other police-officers that the knife, with which the throat was cut, was washed and kept on a paniara of the mori in the kitchen. The learned Advocate General contends that as this is one statement made by accused No. 2, and it is in consequence of that statement that the knife (Exh. Z/8) was ultimately traced in the kitchen by the police-officers, the whole statement is admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. In support of his contention, he relies on the decisions in Lalji Dusadh V/s. King-Emperor (1927) I.L.R. 6 Pat. 747, In re Sogaimuthu Padayachi (1925) 27 Cr.L.J. 394, Queen- Empress V/s. Nana (1889) I.L.R. 14 Bom. 260 F.B. and Emperor V/s. Ganu Chandra (1931) 34 Bom. L.R. 303.
(2.) In my opinion, the principle stated in Lalji Dusadh V/s. King-Emperor is somewhat wider than is justified by the principles laid down by this High Court. In my opinion, the correct and exact scope of statements made admissible under Section 27 is laid down so far back as 1874 by Mr. Justice West in Reg. V/s. Jora Hasji (1874) 11 B.H.C.R. 242. The learned Judge, after pointing out that Section 27 was an exception to Secs.24, 25 and 26, observed as follows (p. 244): Whatever be the nature of the fact discovered, that fact must, in all cases, be itself relevant to the case, and the connection between it and the statement made must have been such that that statement constituted the information through which the discovery was made, in order to render the statement admissible. Other statements connected with the one thus made evidence, and so mediately, but not necessarily or directly, connected with the fact discovered, are not to be admitted, as this would rather be an evasion than a fulfilment of the law, which is designed to guard prisoners accused of offences against unfair practices on the part of the police.
(3.) The decision in Emperor V/s. Ganu Chandra also shows that, although a series of statements may be made as if in one sentence to the police-officer, the Court should dissect them and admit only such portion of that statement as directly led to the discovery of the thing, as provided in Section 27. The point, in my opinion, is made still more clear by the decision in Amiruddin Ahmed V/s. Emperor (1917) I.L.R. 45 Cal. 557 where it is stated as follows: If a single statement contains more information than is contemplated by Section 27, the whole statement is not admissible but only the particular information which led to the discovery.