(1.) The question raised on this application is whether the execution of the decree is barred by the law of limitation.
(2.) It is clear on the facts that the application for execution made on June 27, 1932, was barred, unless the decree was kept alive either by an application for execution in accordance with law or by some step-in-aid of execution under Art. 182 of the Indian Limitation Act. It is clear on the authorities that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the benefit of the time occupied between May 1925 a January, 15, 1929, in the Phaltan Court, which is a foreign Court, nor can they avail themselves of the execution proceedings pending in that Court to support their contention.
(3.) The plaintiffs rely, firstly, on the application made to the Sholapur Court on July 8, 1929, for transfer of the decree to Kolhapur and, secondly, on the application for reconstruction of the decree on March 30, 1931, as a step-in-aid of execution. As to the first contention it is clear that that application cannot help the plaintiffs as on that day the decree was barred. Nor can the plaintiffs rely on it as res judicata as on that application notices were not issued to the defendants, and they never appeared. The question which has been forcibly argued by Mr. Coltman, and which seems to be the only question in this case is, whether the application for the reconstruction of the decree is a step-in-aid of execution. Mr. Coltman says that the plaintiffs stated in that application that they wanted the decree to be reconstructed for taking the execution proceedings to carry out the decree and therefore it is a step-in-aid within the meaning of Art. 182, and relies in support of his argument on the case of Gulappa V/s. Erava. (1921) I.L.R. 46 Bom. 269 It is obvious that if this is a step-in-aid, the present application is saved ; if it is not, the decree is barred. This is conceded by the learned Counsel.