F D R FOOTWEAR Vs. NWRAILWAY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This application arises out of a suit for compensation for nondelivery of certain property consigned by the plaintiff through the defendant Railway Administrations. The Secretary of State is impleaded as the railways are State Railways. It appears that two consignments were despatched by the plaintiff from Agra to Wazirabad. The first arrived on 27 January 1930 and the second on 9 February 1930. Delivery was not taken of the consignments and ultimately they were sent to the lost property office and sold in the ordinary course of procedure. The plaintiff was informed that a certain sum stood to his credit as the sale proceeds, but he refused to accept the amount offered and filed the present suit on 3 July 1931. It was pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation and the suit has been dismissed on this preliminary point.

(2.) The article applied by the trial Court was Art. 31 which gives a period of one year for a suit against a carrier for compensation for non-delivery of. or delay in delivering, goods and the period runs from the time when the goods ought to be delivered. The trial Court took the view that the goods ought to have been delivered when the consignments arrived at their destination and as the suit had been filed more than a year from the later of these dates, it was time barred. The first point taken is that Art. 31 does not apply because Government is not a "carrier" within the meaning of Art. 31. It is pointed out that in Section 2, Carriers Act, 1865, the expression "common carrier" is defined as denoting a person other than the Government, engaged in the business of transporting for hire property from place to place, by land or inland navigation for all persona indiscriminately.

(3.) The argument is that Government is expressly excluded from the definition of "common carrier;" so Art. 31 cannot apply to a suit against a State Railway. In this case it appears that both the railways concerned, namely, N.W. Railway and the G.I.P. Railway are State Railways. I think there is no force in this contention. It is true that Government is excluded from the definition of "common carrier" for the purpose of the Carriers Act 1865 but Art. 31, Limitation Act, does not contain the expression "common carrier;" it only applies to a "carrier" and is therefore presumably of a wider meaning. I see no reason on the face of it why it should not apply to a State Railway and Art. 31 has been applied to the case of a State Railway in Radha Shyam Basalt V/s. Secretary of State (1917) 44 Cal 16. I may also note that in Mutsadi Lal V/s. B.B. & C.I. Ry. Co. A.I.R. 1920 All 157 Article 31 was applied to a suit of this nature although it does not appear that the railway in question was a State Railway.