T H BIRD Vs. EMPEROR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The Tata Iron and Steel Co. of Jamshedpur leased certain laud in 1920, to a cultivator for one year. He and his son after him, retained possession from 1920 till 1933. For ten years of this period he had held without any written lease, though it is said that he held from year to year, until finally in 1932 there was a written lease for one year when the son Purusottom executed a kabuliyat stipulating that he would hold the land until March 31, 1933. In December 1932, he was given notice to quit on the expiry of his lease; but he remained in possession and declined to leave the land. On April 20, 1933, Srish Chandra on behalf of the Steel Company remonstrated with Purusottam who was cultivating the land; but Purusottom took no notice of the remonstrance. Later in the day, a party consisting of the four petitioners now before the Court came to the land and ordered Purusottom to leave it. He refused to leave and he was removed by force, being actually assaulted, though not grievously, while his ploughs and cattle were taken away from him. Purusottom prosecuted the four petitioners in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Dhalbhum who convicted them of offences punishable under Secs.447 and 352 of the Indian Penal Code. He sentenced Mr. Bird and Mr. Khurodi to a fine of Rs. 100 each, and the other two petitioners each to a fine of Rs. 20, under Section 447, passing no separate sentence under Section 352. The learned Magistrate found that Purusottom was in possession of the land. He discussed the question of whether he had acquired occupancy right in the land, and was of opinion on the whole that he was an occupancy raiyat. He found that force had been used by the party sufficient to dispossess the complainant in furtherance of a common intention to evict him. His finding on the question of intention might have been more clearly expressed; but the cat-e was not one in which a formal charge had to be framed and the findings, as appear, from the discussion of the case by the Magistrate, appear to be that Ike party of the accused, believing that they had a right to do so, entered on the land which was in the peaceable and lawful possession of the complainant, and that being there, they evicted him by force, that is to say, by the exercise of intimidation, The decision was affirmed,, on appeal by the Sessions Judge who affirmed the finding that the complainant was in possession of the land, expressing the opinion that he had acquired occupancy right in it. He found that the petitioners came to the place in order to oust the complainant forcibly and by intimidation; that their force was not excessive but was used as a demonstration to intimidate the complainant and to compel him to give up the land. He accordingly dismissed the appeal.

(2.) Mr. P. R. Das, on behalf of the petitioners argues in the first place that the complainant could not properly be deemed to be in possession of the land, since his lease had expired; and that in any event the landlord should be as well regarded as being in possession as the tenant. He further argues that forcible eviction of a tenant made by a landlord in exercise of a bona fide claim, of right cannot be regarded as an offence coming within the definition of criminal trespass contained in Section 441, of the Indian Penal Code. He argues that the intention of the petitioners was merely to eject the complainant, and that they cannot be said to have entered on the land or remained on it with the intention to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy him.

(3.) Mr. Das, has discussed a number of decisions before us which may be mentioned in the order of their dates. The first in point of time is that of Emperor V/s. Lakshman Raghunath 26 B 558 : 4 Bom. L. R. 280. The facts and the effect of the decision are summed up in the head-note: The accused No. 1 who held a decree against a judgment-debtor, went with his son, accused No. 2, and a Civil Court bailiff to execute a warrant. Finding the door of the judgment-debtor's house shut, they entered his compound by passing through the complainant's house without his consent and notwithstanding his protest. Held, that the act of the accused amounted to criminal trespass, for, when they trespassed on the complainant's house notwithstanding his protest, they must, as reasonable men, have known that they would annoy him.