VASISTHA NARAIN SINHA Vs. SANT LAL KUMAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Under Section 138, Bengal Local Self-Government Act (Act III of 1885) which applies to this province, the legislature gave the Local Government power to frame rules relating to the conduct of elections to the District or Local Board and inter alia to determine the authority "who shall decide disputes relating to such elections." It is quite clear from that provision that the Local Government was entitled to set up a tribunal which should have power to deal with all disputes relating to elections and what is ordinarily spoken of as election petitions. It is clear, however, that under that authority power was not fully exercised when regard is had to the rules which were framed under the section to which I have referred. Rule 158 of the Rules governing to elections to the District Boards reads as follows: All disputes arising under these rules in regard to any matter other than a matter the decision of which by any other authority is declared by these rule3 to be final, shall be decided by the Wstriot Magistrate whose decision shall be filial.

(2.) It is clear that the Local Government has limited the power of the District Magistrate under that rule to decide disputes arising under the rules, and it may be said that a large number of disputes do arise which affect the validity of elections but which under no circumstances could be said, having regard to the provisions of the rules to which I am referring, to come under those rules. The matter that we have to determine in this case is whether the matters complained of by the plaintiffs in their action were matters that came under the rules and whether, according to the defendant, the disputes which have arisen are matters which had to be decided by the District Magistrate. The plaintiffs were the unsuccessful candidates in the election to the District Board, the defendant being the successful candidate, and I regret to say that this matter has to be decided in circumstances which made the question argued merely academic. Another election has since taken place and therefore the only question of substance in the case is the question of costs, which the defendant, being the unsuccessful party in the litigation in the Court below, was ordered to pay.

(3.) The plaintiff complained---and I propose to deal with the allegations of the plaintiff generally---that the presiding officer at this election was a partizan, he was favouring the election of the defendant and that many of his acts were evidence of that allegation. The gravamen of the plaint however is that his conduct was such that when the plaintiffs objected, the defendant ordered his men to attack the plaintiff's party with the result that something in the nature of a riot took place which resulted again in there being no free voting. I must state at this stage of my observations that the matter comes before us on the pleadings and on the judgment alone. There is no evidence, the parties agreeing to argue the appeal on these materials. The facts as found by the learned Subordinate Judge must be considered to be binding upon this Court. Reading the pleadings together with the judgment, it is clear, as I have already observed, that the real charge against the defendant was that the conduct of the presiding officer was such as to bring about what I have described as a riot, and so far as the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge in the Court below is concerned, the matter seems to be summed up in this observation: I have no hesitation to say that at the instance of the defendant there was a serious rioting on account of which the voters fled away and the poll was closed from noon, and again It is evident from the testimony of the returning officer that the majority of the voters could not exercise their right of franchise and as such the election cannot be upheld.