EMPEROR Vs. HOMNARAIN SUKHAILAL KACHHI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) VIVIAN Bose, A.J.C. 1. The accused is a driver of a motor lorry who has been convicted under Sections 279 and 337, I.P.C., for driving along the Nagpur-Talegaon road in a rash and negligent manner and causing hurt to one man. The case was tried summarily and the accused was convicted under Section 243 Criminal P.C. be cause he is said to have pleaded guilty. What he actually said was this: Guilty. Near Patora on Amraoti-Nagpar road while taking a turn I saw about a dozen persons sitting on the road about 80 paces away from my lorry and who on hearing the noise of the engine began to run here and there. I slowed down and applied the brakes but in spite of it the lorry struck one person. I was not driving more then 25 miles per hour.

(2.) I am unable to construe this as " an admission of the truth of the accusation" against him, even if he did use the word " guilty." Courts should not be astute to construe technical words inadvertently used by accused persons not trained to the law against them, but should look to the statement as a whole and place a fair and liberal construction on it after giving the benefit of every reasonable doubt to the accused. In the present case it is obvious that when he used the word "guilty" the accused only meant that he admitted causing injury to the complainant and no more. The remainder of the statement makes it clear that he considered the occurrence to be an unfortunate accident which he did his best to avoid, and which was caused, if anything, by the stupidity and bewildering of the persons on the road. This is anything but a plea of guilty. I therefore accept the reference made by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and set aside the conviction and sentence. The reference further proposes that a retrial should be ordered, I am not prepared to do this. The challan discloses no facts on which the accused could be convicted. The first information report was made by one Abdul Nabi a head constable. He states that be was travelling in a lorry proceeding in the other direction. It had a break down and so stopped in the middle of the road. The passengers then alighted and so did he. Then he continues: I was standing on the slope on the right side. Other persons were also standing. In the meantime another motor from the direction of Nagpur to Talegaon appeared. All other parsons and myself raised our hands to stop the motor car. But the motor driver did not stop it. He stopped it after felling me with a push.

(3.) AS a matter of fact the accused says he did attempt to pull up, and prima facie it does seem likely, but even if he did not he would not have been in the wrong, provided be attempted to pass in a careful, and cautious manner; and there is no allegation in the report that he did not. Section 4, Motor Vehicles Act, 1914, does not apply in this ease. The challan carries the matter a little further. It states that the accused passed on the wrong side of the road at an excessive speed and so injured the complainant. On the question of excessive speed the District Magistrate in showing cause states that the accused is being tried for negligent driving and not for fast driving and so it is immaterial whether he was going at 25 miles an hour or not. It appears then that the accused estimate of his pace is not being Challenged. Now 25 miles an hour is not an excessive pace at which to pass another vehicle on an open road. So that in itself is no evidence of negligence. The fact that there were several persons scattered about the road also does not render his action negligent in this particular case. The prosecution admit they were all aware of his approach and were looking at him at the time. They had therefore ample opportunity to get out of way, and the accused had every right to assume they would do so. Motorists are not only persons who owe a duty of care; others also have a responsibility and must conform to the ordinary usages of the road. If they had not seen him coming it would have been a different matter.