MAHESHCHANDRA SHAHA Vs. ANANDACHANDRA SHAHA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The point raised on these two appeals is short and simple. Plaintiffs sued on mortgage bonds, which stipulated for payment of compound interest. The defendant's case was that, when he came to sign the bonds, he objected to this stipulation and refused to sign. Later, he was persuaded to sign, on plaintiffs promising not to enforce the stipulation. The District Judge held that such evidence was inadmissible and allowed the claim. No principle of law is clearer than that, when the terms of a contract have been reduced to the form of a document, no extrinsic evidence is admitted to con-tradict, vary, add to, or subtract from its terms. This principle is embodied in Section 92, Evidence Act. It is true that evidence may always be given, which tends to show that the document is invalid, such as evidence of fraud, error, or incapacity. This is stated in the first provision to the section. That is to say, a party may show by such evidence that his signature to a document was procured by means of fraud or, in other words, that there was fraud in its inception. Thus, evidence would be relevant to show that the plaintiffs always intended to enforce the stipulation, and obtained defendant's signature by means of a misrepresentation of fact, namely, their intention at the time of signature. But evidence that plaintiffs, at some later date, sought to enforce the stipulation is not evidence sufficient to prove that they had this intention when the document was signed. The cases, which have been mentioned and which are relevant, do not support any different or more extended proposition of law. The law on this point in India must be ascertained from the terms of the section and not otherwise: Balhishen Das V/s. Legge (1899) 22 AII 149, Maung Kyin V/s. Ma ShweLa AIR 1917 PC 207. The decision in Nadia Chand Saha V/s. Birendra Chandra Dutt AIR 1917 Cal 186 can be supported on the ground that the Judges found misrepresentation at the time of signature, though it is difficult to discover any evidence in support of that fact. They refer to Sir Richard Couch's judgment in Pertap Chunder Ghose v. Mohendranath Purkait (1889) 17 Cal 291, which purports to be based upon the sound proposition that where one party induces the other to contract on the faith of representations made to him, any one of which is untrue, the whole contract is, in a Court of equity, considered as having been obtained fraudulently.

(2.) It is true that both these decisions appear to go further and to suggest that, where the plaintiff told the defendant that a certain stipulation in a document would not be enforced, they cannot be held to have assented to it, as the document is not the real agreement between the parties, and the plaintiff cannot sue upon it. But this means, obviously, that a document may be invalid or a person entitled to a decree or order relating thereto, on the ground of mistake in fact or law, as stated in the first proviso, because the Judges in the former case say that the test is whether the defendant can maintain a suit for rescission, cancellation or variation of the contract. Moreover, this case is clearly distinguishable, because it turned upon the question upon what terms the defendant had held over after the termination of the period of his lease, and in the other case it was found that the defendant's signature to the document had been procured by means of a fraudulent misrepresentation about the existing law. For these reasons, I am of opinion that the decision of the District Judge was correct, and the appeals are dismissed with one set of costs. The cross-objections are not pressed and are dismissed. M.C.Ghose, J.

(3.) These are two appeals by the defendants in a mortgage suit. The only question in the two appeals is whether compound interest could be claimed on the deed by the plaintiff mortgagee. The deed shows that interest was to run at Re. 1-6 per cent, per month with yearly rests. Defendant pleaded that the deed was written before the defendant appeared and, when the defendant came to know about the compound interest, he protested and refused to take the loan, unless the plaintiff agreed not to take compound interest. That, thereupon, the plaintiff agreed not to take any compound interest and, upon that assurance, the defendant executed the deed. The trial Judge found on the evidence that the defendant's plea was true. The Court of appeal held that, having regard to Section 92, Evidence Act, oral evidence was inadmissible to prove the alleged plea of the defendant.