MANGU LAL GANGA CHARAN Vs. MUNNI LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Civil Revisions Nos. 195 of 1932, 196 of 1932 and 290 of 1932 are connected and I propose to deliver a consolidated judgment because the same points arise for consideration in all of them. Three suits were brought by the plaintiffs of the three cases against the firm Ajodhia Prasad Sheonarain. The suits have been decreed against certain persons but dismissed against Manni Lal and Sheo Narain, son of Chotey Lal. The questions that arise in these revisions are whether the suits should be decreed or not against Sheo Narain, son of Chotey Lal, and Manni Lal also on the ground that they too were partners of the firm Ajodhia Prasad Sheo Narain. It is conceded that so far as Manni Lal is concerned no personal decree can be passed against him because he is a minor; but what is claimed is that his share of the joint family property is liable for these debts.

(2.) So far as Sheo Narain, son of Chotey Lal, is concerned there is a clear finding of fact to the effect that he was never a partner of the firm of Ajodhia Prasad Sheo Narain, and it is impossible to say that this finding is vitiated by reason of any mistake of law. It was next argued that as the said Sheo Narain did not produce any witness, the decree inasmuch as it allows costs of witnesses as well, is erroneous. The question of costs is principally within the discretion of the Court below and unlesss I am satisfied that this discretion has been exercised arbitrarily, I am not called upon to interfere in revision with that discretion. The fact remains that the plaintiff attempted to prove that Sheo Narain, son of Chotey Lal was a partner of the defendant firm and a lot of oral evidence was led on that behalf. It may well be that after the plaintiff had produced his evidence Sheo Narain was advised that no case had been made out against him and producing evidence on his behalf was a sheer waste of public time; he therefore produced no witnesses; but it cannot be said that the summoning of witnesses by him was clearly unnecessary. I am therefore of the opinion that the Court below in allowing Sheo Narain costs of his witnesses did not act arbitrarily. The revision so far as Sheo Narain, son of Chotey Lal, is concerned is dismissed with costs, which will be separately taxed from the costs incurred by Manni Lal who is separately represented before me.

(3.) Along with the suits out of which the present revision and the connected revisions have arisen another suit, namely Suit No. 117 of 1930, was tried by the Court below and a full judgment has been delivered in that case on the question whether Manni Lal was a partner of the firm Ajodhia Prasad Sheo Narain. Manni Lal is a minor and the Court below applying Section 247, Contract Act, and holding that there was no evidence to prove that the minor Manni Lal was admitted to the benefits of the partnership held that no decree could be passed against Manni Lal. It has however been argued before me that the Court below has clearly misunderstood the law applicable to the facts and that there was no necessity to prove by evidence that Manni Lal was admitted to the benefits of the partnership because the other facts as found by the Court below and established by the evidence speak for themselves and fasten the liability on Manni Lal. These facts are that the family to which Ajodhia Prasad and Manni Lal belong is a trading family whose kulachar was trade, handed down from the time of its ancestors and the firm Ajodhia Prasad Sheo Narain which was formed subsequently was only an offshoot of the ancestral firm. It is argued that the debts evidenced by the hundis upon which the suits in the Court below were brought were debts incurred by Ajodhia Prasad, manager of the family of Ajodhia Prasad and Manni Lal and of the firm of Ajodhia Prasad Sheo Narain and therefore he had an implied authority to contract debts for the purposes of the trade and the creditor was not bound to inquire into the purpose of the debt or to investigate into the status of the family for the purpose of finding out whether there were minors in it or not in order to bind the whole family; property thereby because that power is incidental to and is necessary for the very existence of the family trade. The following short pedigree might be necessary for understanding the facts of the case: