KELU ACHAN Vs. CHERIYA PARVATHI NETHIYAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In S.A. No. 286 of 1920. The first question we have to decide is whether this suit was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Munsif, by whom it was tried. The valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction is, under Section 8, Suits Valuation Act, (VII of 1887), the same as the valuation for the computation of Court Fees. The reliefs asked for and to be valued are, as appears from the pleadings, which are given at unnecessary length in the District Munsif's judgment, three: 1. Removal of 1 Defendant from tavazhi management.

(2.) A declaration that a Karipanayam, dated, 2nd July, 1916, is not binding on any of the seventeen items in A schedule and a direction to Defendants in respect of items 1 to 15, which (it is not disputed) would be equivalent to a decree for delivery thereof.

(3.) A declaration in respect of another Karipanayam and a decree for surrender of it and connected documents. 2. There is no dispute as to the valuation of the first and third of these; and the question, it is agreed, is only whether the second should be valued as plaintiffs have valued it at Rs. 500 for delivery of items 1 to 15. with reference to the revenue payable thereon, under Court Fees Act, Section 7(v)(b) and Rs. 10 for the declaration asked for, regarded as one relating to all the seventeen items under Schedule II, Art. 17(iii); or whether it should be valued, as defendants contend under Section 7(v)(b) for items 1 to 15 and under Section 7(iv)(c) for the relief asked for in respect of items 16 and 17 at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint. The importance of the latter contention lies in the fact, which is not disputed, that it entails an enhancement of the total valuation of the suit beyond the District Munsif's pecuniary jurisdiction, since, as appears from the reference in plaint paragraph 11-B2, the value of the buildings on items 16 and 17 is over Rs. 3,000. 3. The lower appellate Court decided for plaintiffs, partly on the ground that the inclusion of a prayer in respect of items 16 and 17 was, as alleged by plaintiff's vakil before it, a mistake and that no relief was asked for in respect of them. But it is sufficient that the plaint was not in fact amended consistently with any such statement and that here Mr. Madhavan Nair for plaintiffs was ready to withdraw the claim to relief in respect of these items, which is certainly made in the plaint, only in case our conclusion as to jurisdiction should be against him. On the merits the matter is concluded by the decision in Shidappa Venkatrao V/s. Rachappa Subrao [1912] 36 Bom. 628 in which I respectfully concur. That decision is based on the application of Section 17, Court Fees Act; and that Section is applicable to the case before us, since there is, to my mind, no reason for following the opinion expressed in Durga Prasad V/s. Purandar Singh [1904] 27 All. 186 and holding that the distinct subjects referred to must necessarily be distinct causes of action. It further does not seem to me that the conclusion as to valuation in the Bombay case cited is affected by the judgment of the Privy Council in Appeal Rachappa Subrao Desai V/s. Shidappa Venkatrao [1919] Bom. 507. The reference to the real value of the property in suit as undisplaced for purposes of jurisdiction by the notional value was made in connection with the portion of the claim for which the fixed fee was payable under Schedule II; and it was in that connection there, as it is here, that the admissibility of the real value as determining jurisdiction was material, the succeeding paragraph relating to the other part of the suit. And in fact the decision in plaintiff's favour was given not on the ground that the technical objection relied on by defendant was-unsubstantial but because owing to the failure to take it earlier, a merely technical objection could not prevail.