(1.) In this case the few material facts are these. A decree was passed by the lower appellate Court on the 27 November 1917 under which the mortgagor was to pay a certain sum within six months, and in the event of his failure to pay he was to be debarred from redeeming. That time expired on the 27 May 1918. In the meanwhile the mortgagor preferred a second appeal to this Court from that decree on the 12 March 1918, which was dismissed under Order XLI, Rule 11, on the 9 July 1918. On the application of the mortgagee the decree was made absolute on the 3 October 1918, after notice to the mortgagor. The mortgagor tendered the money payable under the decree passed on the 27 November 1917 in Court on the 23 October 1918, and made an. application for execution of the decree claiming redemption. But his application was rejected, and his further prayer for extension of time under Order XXXIV, Rule 8, also was disallowed.
(2.) From this order of the Subordinate Judge rejecting his application he appealed to the District Court, and the learned District Judge of Satara dismissed his appeal with costs, accepting the view taken by the Court of first instance on both the points.
(3.) From that decree the applicant has appealed to this Court, and it is urged by way of preliminary objection that the appeal, so far as it relates to the prayer for extension of time under Order XXXIV, Rule 8, is not competent because the order refusing-to extend time is appealable as an order under Order XLIII, Rule 1(o), and that no further appeal is allowed from an order made in appeal. Section 104, Sub-section (2) of the Civil Procedure Code, is clear on the point. The preliminary objection seems to be good so far.