EAST INDIAN RAILWAY CO Vs. KANAI LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application under Section 115, Civ. Pro. Code, and it has arisen under the following circumstances : On the 13 June, 1920, the Opposite Party delivered to the Jodhpur Bikaneer Railway at Bikaneer Station for carriage to Howrah as passenger's luggage 12 packages, 7 of which were placed in the guard's van. At Howrah the Opposite Party received all the said packages save one of those placed in the guard's van, which had been lost in transit. On the 26 April, 1921, the Opposite Party instituted a suit in the Calcutta Small Cause Court for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 981-4 in respect of the package which was lost against the East Indian Railway Company. On the 7 February, 1923, the suit was decreed in favour of the Opposite Party, although the Petitioner-Company had taken the point that no notice of suit under Section 77 of the Railways Act had been given. The Petitioner Company now contends that the learned. Judge in the Small Cause Court had exercised a jurisdiction not vested in him by law in entertaining and decreeing the suit; against the East Indian Railway Company in the absence of a notice under Section 77 of the Railways Act. The Petitioner Company applied to my learned brother, Mr. Justice Greaves, on the 20 August, 1923, and obtained a rule under Section 115, C.P.C. against the Opposite Party and this rule has now come on for hearing: before me.

(2.) On behalf of the Petitioner Company considerable stress has been laid on the case of Hindley V/s. Joynarain Manwri (1919) 46 Cal. 962, and on the case of Assam Bengal Ry. Co. Ltd. V/s. Badhika Mohan Nath A.I.R. 1923 Cal. 397, and it has been contended that usurpation of jurisdiction by the Small Cause Court by holding that a notice under Section 77 of the Railways Act is unnecessary can be revised by this Court under Section 115, C.P.C. Sir Binode Mitter for the Opposite Party has contended that the present is not a case of usurpation of authority, nor is it a case of a conscious violation of a rule of law and that therefore, on the authority of the decision of the Privy Council in Ameer Hossain V/s. Sheo Baksh (1884) 11 Cal. 6 (P.C.), the present rule ought to be discharged.

(3.) It is well settled that where a Court has jurisdiction to determine a question and it has determined that question, it cannot be said to have acted illegally or with material irregularity, simply because it has come to an erroneous decision. The leading case on this subject is the case of Ameer Hossain (1884) 11 Cal. 6 (P.C.) cited above, and following this decision it has been held that the High Court will not interfere under Section 115, C. P. C, merely because the lower Court had wrongly decided that a suit was barred by limitation, or that it was barred as res judicata, or because the lower Court had proceeded upon an erroneous construction of the sections of an Act, or had misunderstood the effect of a document in evidence, or had excluded evidence which it ought to have admitted. The Privy Council in the case of Balkrishna V/s. Vasudeva A.I.R. 1917 P.C. 71 observed us follows : "It will be observed that Section 115 applies to jurisdiction alone, the irregular exercise of it or the illegal assumption of it. The section is not directed against conclusions of law or fact, in which the question of jurisdiction is not involved." There is no doubt that conflicting views of the scope and effect of Section 115 are to be found in the cases in the reports, and in these latter days I do not fool called upon to reconcile these conflicting views. I ought to add that my attention has been drawn to the case of Jannoitzer V/s. Mohanand Chatterji Unreported by Jenkins, C.J. and Woodroffe, J. The passages in the judgments which are specially relied upon are these: