BROACH CITY MUNICIPALITY Vs. GULAM RASUL HAJI BANUBHAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The only question in this application made un behalf of the Broach City Municipality is whether an order made or a decision given by the District Court under Section 160(3) of the Bombay District Municipal Act (Bom. Act III of 1901) can be executed, or whether it is necessary to make an application to the Court to pass a decree in accordance with the order or decision. It would certainly be very remarkable, when a summary method has been provided for by the Legislature for determining disputes arising for money compensation or damages which are directed to be paid by the Act that it should be necessary in order for the successful party to obtain relief to file a suit when the District Court has come to a definite conclusion on the merits. The District Court in cases in which the compensation is claimed in respect of land should follow, as far as may be, the procedure provided by the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for proceedings in matters referred for the determination of the Court. Under the Land Acquisition Act, in the case of a reference, the Court proceeds to hear the parties, and to determine the value of the land, and to make an award. Clearly that award could be executed as a decree. It follows that where the District Court makes an order under Section 160(3), it must be treated for the purpose of execution in the same way as an award made in a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

(2.) We have been referred to the decision in Chunilal Virchand V/s. Ahmedabad Municipality (1911) I.L.R. 36 Bom. 47: 13 Bom. L.R. 958 but that, if anything, is against the present applicant's contention. It was decided there that no appeal lies from the decision of a District Court under Section 160(3) of the Bombay District Municipal Act, 1901. Once we find that the decision of the Court under that section is considered as an order, though it may not be a decree, it must follow that there is some way for the parties entitled to the benefit of the order to get satisfaction without having to file another suit.

(3.) Again it is clear from Section 160, proviso (b), that the Court has full power to give and apportion the costs of all proceedings in any manner it thinks fit, According to the applicant's contention, although the Court had full power to apportion costs, it had no power to issue execution in order that a successful party might get his costs given to him already by the Court.