RAGHAVENDRA AYYAJI DESAI Vs. GURURAO RAGHAVENDRA DESAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The first question which was raised in this appeal was that no appeal lay because it was, it is urged, an appeal against a decree and such appeal is barred by class. (2) of Section 21 of the second Schedule of the Civil Procedure Code. But we think that the proceedings, and the Judge s order, and the Memorandum of Appeal, make it quite clear that the appeal is not against a decree but is against the order directing that the award be filed." And that is an appeal which is specifically allowed by class. (f) of Section 104 of the Code. There is therefore nothing in that question which was raised as a preliminary point by the respondent. Three separate objections have been taken by the appellant.

(2.) The first is that the award is so indefinite as to be incapable of execution. This objection can be taken under Section 14 of the second Schedule. A careful reading of the award itself discloses that the objection to it, if any, is rather that it is too definite and not indefinite. In one or two matters it was argued, even after this conclusion had been arrived at, that there was indefiniteness. Without going into details it will suffice to say that we are not satisfied that the incapacity to execute any part of the decree to be made on the award will arise from indefiniteness. The only incapacity that will arise will be from the circumstance that a portion of the decree will be declaratory. That of course is not an objection of the kind urged. We think, therefore, that there is no substance in the objection taken under Section 14 of the second Schedule.

(3.) Then it was objected that the Court had no jurisdiction to order the award to be filed. This objection in the first instance was based on Section 20 of the second Schedule, and it took this form. The award deals amongst other things with manpan, matters relating to a compliment or dignity, and so forth: matters of a kind such that the civil Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain suits arising out of disputes regarding them. Therefore, it was argued that in respect of part of the subject-matter of the award the Court has no jurisdiction, and that as the Court is bound to take the award as a whole and to accept or reject it as a whole, it must in this case reject it. But I do not think that this objection can be upheld under Section 20 of the second Schedule.