A SURYANARAYANA Vs. APATANNA AND EIGHT ORS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) My learned brother has fully dealt with the facts and the points of law involved in these Second Appeals. I add a few words in my own language out of respect to the strenuous arguments advanced by the appellants learned vakil.

(2.) Having regard to the observations in Bhadrayya v. Bapayya and Lakshmi Narasimha Rao v. Seetaramaswami Venkata Narasimha Appa Rao v. Subba Reddi Narasimhacharyalu v. Ramabrahmam Virabhadrayya v. Sonti Venkanna and to the judgment in Venkataraghavayya v. Ramakrishnayya Appeal No. 137 of 1908 and Nukanna v. Sanyasi Naidu Second Appeal No. 168 of 1912, I think that no distinction should be made between an inamdar and a zamindar as to the presumption to be raised in respect of the kudivaram right in lands of which the inamdar or the zamindar is the proprietor. In other words, the presumption ought to be that the inamdar or the zamindar is not the owner of the kudivaram. There are no doubt some observations in Indety China Nagadu v. Potu Konchi Venkatasubbayya (1910) M.W.N., 639 and Marapu Tharalu v. Telukula Neelakanta Behara (1907) I.L.R., 30 Mad., 502 which favour the appellants contention. But the authority of those cases can no longer be relied on, having regard to the uniform tendency of the later decisions. The distinction made in one or two cases between the presumption to be drawn where the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts will be ousted if the inamdar is held not to own the kudivaram, and the presumption to be drawn if no such question of jurisdiction arises in the suit, seems to me (with the greatest respect) a little too fine and farfetched.

(3.) The other contention of the appellants that an inamdar could acquire the kudivaram through abandonment or surrender by the tenant of the holding and that, when he so acquires it, the holding ceases to be a part of the inam estate, has caused me much more anxiety before I could arrive at a decision satisfactory to my mind. The exception to Section 8 uses the general expression "the kudivaram interest has been or is acquired by the inamdar." Mr. Ramesam s argument is that, as it is an exception to Section 8, the modes of acquisition mentioned in the preceding clauses of Section 8 ought to be looked into to find out what the meaning of acquired is as used in the exception, These preceding clauses speak of acquisition by transfer, succession or otherwise, And, according to the decisions of the Calcutta High Court on the corresponding section of the Bengal Tenancy Act [see Badan Chandra Das v. Rajeswari Debya (1905) 2 C.L.J., 570 and Muktakeshi Dasi v. Pulin Behary Singh (1908) 8 C.L.J., 324], this does not include acquisition by mere abandonment or surrender. Again, Section 6, Clause 2 of the Estates Land Act is as follows: "Where land held by a ryot with a permanent right of occupancy, is surrendered or abandoned or save in the case falling within...the exception to Section 8, comes into the possession of the landholder." This shows that the exception to Section 8 which relates to acquisition of the kudivaram right by the landholder is distinguished from the case where the landholder gets power to deal with the land through surrender or abandonment by the tenant-in other words a right got by the landlord through surrender or abandonment of a holding is put under a different category from a right to kudivaram acquired under the exception to Section 8.