MULLANGI VENKATARANGAM CHETTY Vs. MVENKATASUBBAMMAH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a suit brought by the next reversioner of the deceased Subbaraya Chetty, who died in 1899, against his widow Mullangi Venkata Subbammah, who on his death became trustee for her life in succession to him of the charity which is the subject of his suit. On the 12th December 1900, finding, according to her evidence, that she was old and unable to manage the charity and that the reversioner Thumbu Chetty, was also old and infirm and left her to do what she liked with it, she alienated it to the 2nd and 3rd defendants who were maternal relations of her husband. The plaintiff s claim that they are the next reversioners and that this alienation of the trust was illegal, and they ask for a declaration that they are the present trustees of the endowment referred to and entitled to possession of the bazaars and to conduct the charities specified in the schedule, that the alienees may be declared to be the nearest reversioners and to have become entitled to the present enjoyment of the office by reason of the alienation and that, if necessary, the defendant may be removed from her office as trustee of the endowment.

(2.) Now it is not denied on the part of the defendants--it could not be denied, that the widow has no power to alienate the trusteeship; their main defence rests upon this that the plaintiffs are not the next reversioners of the 1st defendant s husband and have no rights in the matter. The plaintiffs are the sons--it has not been seriously disputed--of one Mullangi Venkanna who according to their case was the adopted son of Mullangi Venkatarangam, adopted by his wife Annapoornammal after his death. In the very deed of release Exhibit A, by the 1st defendant to the 2nd and 3rd defendants, it is recited that this Mullangi Venkatarangam was a close relation of the 1st defendant s husband, Mullangi Subbaraya Chetty, and for some years had managed the charity during his lifetime and that his widow, under his directions, had handed it over, after his death, to Subbaraya Chetty who had then become of age to manage it himself. In view of this and other evidence in the case, it is not now disputed by the defendants that this Venkatarangam was a dayadi of the 1st defendant s husband and the only question that remains as to the pedigree is whether it has been proved that the plaintiff s father Venkanna was the adopted son of Venkatarangam. Now the alleged adoption must have taken place, if it took place at all, a very long time ago, as Venkatarangam would appear to have died about the year 1862--at least it is so stated in a plaint filed by the defendant--and only one old lady has been called to speak to it and she gives, as might be expected, a very confused account, at any rate as to the date. But there is a strong body of documentary evidence and evidence of conduct going to establish the adoption. Though it is proved that there were in existence two dayadis of the deceased Venkatarangam one Thumbu Chetty and 1st defendant s husband Subbarayalu, yet it is most clearly proved that even after the death of Annapoorai the property of the deceased Venkatarangam were enjoyed by this man Venkanna who always described himself Mullangi Venkanna as his son; and that this enjoyment which was known to the reversioners was acquiesced in by them and no claim was ever put forward on their behalf. A rather weak suggestion was made by one of the witnesses that the 1st defendant s husband who was a Sub-Registrar was a man of too much dignity to assert any title to these properties, but I think that may be disregarded; and it certainly cannot apply to the other dayadi Thumbu Chetty. Now under Section 50 of the Evidence Act I think that the conduct of all parties is very strong evidence that there really was an adoption. Then there is important documentary evidence contained in sale deeds and mortgages by the deceased Venkanna and in his will in which he describes himself as the adopted son of Venkatarangam.

(3.) This evidence has been tendered and admitted under Sub-section 5 of Section 32 of the Evidence Act which says that " when a statement relates to the existence of any relationship by blood, marriage or adoption between persons as to whose relationship by blood, marriage or adoption the parson making the statement had special means of knowledge, and when the statement was made before the question in dispute was raised, "it is admissible. Mr. Kristnaswami thought to argue that though Venkanna must have had special means of knowledge whether he was adopted or not, his statement was inadmissible because it related to his own relationship. Therefore what his contention came to is this--that he wished to read the section thus : " When a statement relates to the existence of any relationship by blood, marriage or adoption between persons other than the person making the statement. " Not only are those words not there and therefore there is no justification for inserting them, but such a construction of the section would make illustration (k) wrong; because illustration (k) says " where the question is whether A, who is dead, was father of B, a statement by A that B was his son is a relevant fact; and if a statement by the father that B was the son is a relevant fact, I cannot see why a statement by B that A was his father should not equally be a relevant fact; and I am not satisfied that there is any English authority to the contrary, if that were material. It seems to me that on the plain wording of the section this evidence is admissible. Then it comes to this, this man Venkanna not only inherited the property of Venkatarangam without objection but also disposed of it in these various documents which have been put in. And then we have his will in which he described himself as the adopted son of Venkataranganr; and as shewing his connection and his relations with the husband of the 1st defendant there is this very noteworthy circumstance that he made Subbarayalu his executor and provided that if Subbarayalu decided to adopt one of his sons no objection was to be raised to such adoption. There is absolutely no reason for supposing that that will was not made bonafide and did not represent the real state of the relations existing between the parties.