(1.) I adhere to my former judgment, and I think that the appeal should be dismissed with costs. Miller, J.
(2.) As regards the point that the building was not attached to the land by the plaintiff or her husband during the tenancy under Exhibit II, a point which was not taken in the Courts below I do not think it is necessary to hold that Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act would be inapplicable to the case. So far as I can see, the recognition, for the period of the new tenancy, of the tenant s property in the building has no other necessary effect than to prevent the landlord from treating the building as having been surrendered to him at the end of the previous, term; it may be taken as evidence of a contract to allow the removable fixture to remain as such upon the land for the new term. I find nothing inconsistent with this view in Exhibit II, and the effect so far as the tenant s right to the building is concerned, is to reserve to him for the new term whatever rights he had during the old term and not to create new rights i. e. rights distinct in view from the old ones. There is no necessity, I think to infer the creation by Exhibit II of any more extensive right than the plaintiff s husband had before, and seeing that the point was not taken on behalf of the plaintiff below we may therefore not have before us all the available evidence, I am not prepared, to draw any inference in the plaintiff s favor which the words of Exhibit II do not necessarily import.
(3.) As to the question of compensation I think it is clear that it is not the law that, apart from estoppel or contract, the tenant has any right to demand compensation for buildings left by him on the premises when he quits them whether these buildings were erected with the landlord s consent or not. Consent will only be of use to the tenant as leading to an estoppel or as evidencing an agreement. I see no reason, if I may say so, to doubt the correctness of the statement of law on this point in Ismai Kani Rowthen v. Nazarali Sahib.