SONA DEI Vs. FAKIR CHAND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal arises out of a suit in which the plaintiff claimed to recover from the defendants certain offerings which had been made on the occasion of the death of one Rai Bahadur Debi Singh, It appears that the plaintiff and the defendant are both members of the same family of Maha-Brahmans, the common ancestor of which was one Dhan Singh. Both the courts below have found that an arrangement had been come to between the members of the family with a view to the division of the offerings. Certain members of the family were to have certain days of the month and certain other members, other days. Both the courts below have found that the offerings in question were made on a day which belonged to the plaintiff. But the plaintiff s suit was dismissed upon the ground that the offerings in question were personal offerings, made to Fakir Chand, the defendant.

(2.) It is admitted that so far as the donor of these offerings is concerned, no court could interfere to compel him to make the offerings to any particular individual. On the other hand, it has been admitted that an arrangement between the Maha- Brahmans as to the division of the offerings between themselves is perfectly legal. This has been decided in two cases [see Doorga Pershad v. Budree (1874) 6 N.W.P., H.C. Rep., 189, (191) and Oochi v. Ulfat (1898) I.L.R., 20 All., 234]. It seems to me that the whole case turns upon the nature of the agreement and the nature of the gift. There cannot be the least doubt that unless the gift in question was within the scope of the arrangement which the courts below have found existed between the parties, the plaintiff cannot succeed. The agreement was not in writing. It is stated in some what general terms in the plaint and evidently the court below accepted the statement in the plaint as being the terms of the agreement. The object of the agreement was beyond doubt to prevent disputes as to the division of the offerings. As the family increased, some such agreement was obviously very necessary. In my opinion the only fair interpretation to give to the agreement is that the descendants of Dhan Singh agreed amongst themselves that all the offerings that were made upon the occasions of death to any members or member of the family should be divided in accordance with the agreement. As the learned advocate for the plaintiff said in the course of the arguments, the agreement amounted to this, namely, that each member or branch of the family agreed to refrain from taking the offerings on the days assigned to the other member or branch. It is said that this agreement could only apply to offerings that were made to the family as such. This seems to me to be rather a restricted view to take. If it was open to the members of the family to exclude from the scope of the arrangement all gifts which any individual might prevail on the donor to say was to be his, it would mean that the agreement would be practically futile. While, on the other hand, if the agreement is interpreted to include all gifts that were made to any of the members of the family of Dhan Singh, it might reasonably carry out the object of the arrangement, namely, to avoid disputes.

(3.) I next come to the nature of the gift. It must at once be admitted that if this gift was made for a purpose disconnected with cremation ceremonies, the plaintiff would have no right. But reading the evidence of Raghubir Narain Singh it seems to me perfectly clear that this gift was a gift directly in connection with cremation ceremonies, that it was made to one of the members of the family of Dhan Singh, and that the only reason why it was made to Fakir Chand instead of the plaintiff was because the donor has been informed that it would be more efficacious if the gift was not divided and if it was not given to a female. It seems to me that if the offering was of a nature which was included in the agreement between the parties the wishes of the donor could not regulate the rights of the parties to the present suit. Fakir Chand might have refused to take the gift if the donor coupled the donation with the condition that he must keep it entirely for himself. I think that so long as the agreement continued to exist, Fakir Chand having taken the gift was bound to make it over to the plaintiff in accordance with the agreement. For these reasons. I think the decision of the court below was erroneous, and I would allow the appeal. Banerji, J.