SRI B B SARVARAYUDU GARU Vs. KVENKATARAJU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Section 23 of the Madras Estates Land Act says that a land" shall be presumed to be ryoti land other than old waste "until the contrary is proved. The important question in issue in this case is whether the plaint land is ryoti land coming under the definition of" old waste "or" ryoti "land not coming under the definition of" old waste. "For, if it was not" old waste, "Section 6 gives the ryot in possession on the date of the passing of the Act an occupancy right in the land; and this suit by the landlord (appellant before us) in ejectment was rightly dismissed by the Lower Courts." Old waste is defined in Section 3, Clause (7). Clause (7) contains two sub- clauses Nos. (1) and (2). The plaint land admittedly does not come under Sub-clause (1). As regards Sub-clause (2), there are two parts in it. The land in question does not come under the description of the land in the second part, that is, land in respect; of which an ejectment decree against the ryot has been obtained before the coming into force of the Act. As regards the first part of Sub-clause (2), it refers to a land which has remained without occupancy rights being held therein at any time within a period of not less than ten years immediately prior to a letting by the landholder after passing of the Act. To find out whether a land was "old waste" or not at the time of the passing of the Act, a definition which says that a land shall be considered as old waste at the time of a letting after the passing of the Act, if certain conditions are then fulfilled, cannot be resorted to, because Section 6 applied at once on the passing of the Act, and when once occupancy rights are vested in ryot at the time of the passing of the Act, the land ceases to be old waste.

(2.) Hence, it seems to me that the plaint land, which was cleary ryoti land (that is, cultivable land other than private land according to the definition in Section 3, Clause 16) on the date of the coming into force of the Estates Land Act and which land the landlord could not then prove to be "old waste" under either of the sub-clauses of Section 3, must be held to have then been ryoti land other than old waste. If so, the defendant got a right of occupancy then under Section 6 and could not be ejected thereafter.

(3.) As to the argument that the addition made to Section 153 by the Amendment Act of 1909, namely, "nothing shall effect the liability of a non-occupancy ryot to be ejected on the ground of the expiry of the term of a lease granted before the passing of this Act," that this addition would become useless if all non-occupancy ryots in possession got occupancy rights on the passing of the Act, there are certain kinds of non-occupancy ryots included in Section 6, Clauses 3, 4 and 5 of the Act who do not obtain occupancy rights even if they were in possession on the date of the coming into force of the Act. The additional clause inserted by the amending Act in Section 153 would apply to such lands. On these grounds I would dismiss this Second Appeal with costs.