VAIRAVAN CHETTIAR Vs. AVICHA CHETTIAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) So far as the 1st and 2nd Respondents are concerned this appeal must fail on the finding of the Subordinate Judge, with which we agree. There is no evidence that the 3rd defendant (3rd respondent) executed Exhibit C with the authority of his father, Chockalinga, or that Exhibit C was subsequently ratified either by Chockalinga or by Srirangam Achi and Sivagami who succeeded Chockalinga in the guardianship of the 1st and 2nd defendants. The 3rd defendant s testimony is completely against the plaintiffs. It may be that he is not speaking the truth but in the absence of any evidence to prove plaintiffs case their claim against the 1st and 2nd respondents must fail. Exhibit A does not shew that Srirangam Achi and Sivagami intended to ratify Exhibit C. The appeal must therefore be dismissed with costs as against the 1st and 2nd Respondents.

(2.) The next question is whether the 3rd defendant is liable to compensate the plaintiffs for the damage caused to them by his executing Exhibit C. without the authority of Chockalinga. Several questions of fact and law, the solution of some of which is not free from difficulty, have been argued in connection with this point, but we abstain from discussing them as we are of opinion that the claim of the 3rd defendant must fail on the ground of limitation.

(3.) The covenant in Exhibit C. is that the barque Vettival should be sold and the pass for it standing in the name of Chockalinga should be transferred to the plaintiffs within one month after the barque returned to Negapatam or Thondi. This took place according to the plaintiff s on the 10th of January 1904. The suit was instituted on the 31st July 1907 that is more than 31/2 years after the boat returned to Thondi. What is the article of the Limitation Act applicable to the case ? The third respondent contends that it is Article 36 or Article 115, while the appellant urges that it is Article 120, no other article being applicable. We do not think that Article 36 can be held to be applicable, It relates to a suit for compensation for any malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance independent of contract and not specially provided for in the schedule. Assuming that the action may be held to be one in tort, it is certainly not for a wrong independent of contract but one connected with a contract and arising from one of the incidents of a contract. A person entering into a contract on behalf of a principal ought not to do so without authority from the principal. His acting on behalf of the alleged principal amounts to a representation that he has authority from the latter to do so. His acting without such authority is a wrong connected with the contract. The case cannot therefore fall within the purview of Article 36.