(1.) The plaintiff who is the pattadar of a certain village in the district of Trichinopoly which is a ryotwari tract seeks in the suits in which the second appeals have arisen to eject the defendants from the lands in their possession. The defendants alleged that they had a permanent right to the lands in dispute and this was the most important question for trial. There were two classes of land involved in the suit, garden land and dry land. The District Munsif found with respect to the lands of the former description that the defendants had a permanent right to them subject to certain yearly payments to be made by the defendants to the plaintiff and were not liable to be ejected therefrom, but he came to a different conclusion with respect to the dry lands and decreed the plaintiff s claim with respect to them. Against the judgment of the District Munsiff so far as the garden lands are concerned the plaintiff filed an appeal to the District Judge and the defendants filed a memorandum of objections as regards the dry lands. The judgment of the District Judge dealing with the points raised before him in appeal cannot be said to be satisfactory. As regards the main point he set before himself this question " whether the defendants have shown that the plaintiff or his predecessor in title had contracted that the right of tenancy should be changed into a right of permanent occupancy." Apart from the question as to whether in ryotwari tracts there is any presumption that persons in occupation of land, making certain yearly payments to the pattadar, should be deemed to be tenants from year to year - a question on which we express no opinion at present - the real point for determination before the learned judge was whether on the admitted and undoubted facts of the cases and the evidence of both sides the defendants held the lands in their possession as tenants from year to year or as persons having a right of permanent occupancy. It cannot be said that in this case there is no evidence in support of the right claimed by the defendants. For instance it is clear that the defendants have been holding the lands in question for a very long time and the payments they have been making to the plaintiff and his ancestors were found by the District Munsif to be at an unvarying rate and there is also evidence of transfers, by way of sale, usufructuary mortgages and leases, by the defendants and their ancestors to different persons including some of the pattadars, of recognition of such transfers by some of the pattadars, and of improvements of considerable value made in the land by the defendants. It was for the learned judge to have applied his mind to this evidence and to draw such inferences as they led to in the circumstances of the cases. We cannot say that the District Judge has so dealt with the cases. Further on several points he seems to be under a misapprehension as to the state of evidence. For instance he says there is no evidence to show that the defendants or their ancestors made improvements on the land by digging wells or ponds, while as a matter of fact there is evidence on the point; and this is admitted by the learned Advocate-General. We are unable therefore to accept the finding of the lower appellate court as to the nature of the right under which the defendants hold the land. Then there was another question for decision in this connection, viz., that of estoppel; whether the plaintiff, if he was found to have by his conduct induced the defendants to believe that they had a permanent right of occupancy in the land and to spend their money and labouror to do other acts under such belief, he would be estopped from denying that the defendants had such a right.
(2.) Supposing it be found that the plaintiff is entitled to eject the defendants there would be a further question as to whether the defendants or any of them would be entitled to any, and, if so, what compensation for improvements in the shape of wells and ponds dug in the land by them or their predecessors. We have already pointed out that the District Judge is wrong in saying that there is no evidence to show that the defendants made any improvements. We would therefore ask the District Judge to return revised findings on the following questions: (1) Whether the appellants in these appeals are tenants from year to year or whether they have a permanent right of occupancy in the lands in dispute. (2) Whether the plaintiff is estopped from denying that the appellants in these appeals have a permanent right of occupancy. (3) What compensation, if any, each of the appellants in these appeals is entitled to for effecting improvements on the land by digging wells and ponds. The District Judge will also find the nature and value of any buildings constructed by each of the appellants in these appeals. The compensation, if any, due to each of the appellants in these appeals must be found separately. We may add that Mr. Rangachariar also argued that the suit ought to have been dismissed for misjoinder of parties and causes of action. But we are unable to give effect to that contention in second appeal in the ciscumstances of these cases. But it may be that the defendants would not be jointly and severally liable for the mesne profits and costs. The District Judge will therefore also find (4) What mesne profits each of the appellants in these appeals will be laible for in case of ejectment. He will call upon each of the appellants in these appeals to state particulars of the lands in his possession.
(3.) Both the parties will be allowed to adduce fresh evidence on the above points. The findings should be submitted within three months and ten days will be allowed for filing objections. The plaintiff undertakes not to execute the decree for mesne profits till the disposal of these appeals.