(1.) We think that the matter is practically concluded by the dictum of the Privy Council in the recent case of Ghulam Jilani V/s. Muhammed Hassan L.R. 29 I.A. 51, that an order made on an application to file an award under Section 525 of the Civil Procedure Code " would seem to be a decree within the meaning of that expression as denned in the Civil Procedure Code." This is a considered dictum and is, we think, fully in accordance with the scheme and policy of the Code.
(2.) The decision of the Privy Council in Muhammad Nawaz Khan V/s. Alam Khan I.L.R., 18 C. 414 is not at variance with the above view. We think that the contrary view taken in Mana Vihrama V/s. Krishnan Nambudri I.L.R. 3 M. 68 is erroneous.
(3.) Our answer to the reference made to us is (1) that the order of the District Munsif refusing to file the award and setting it aside is a decree and (2) that an appeal lay against that decree.