KAMESWAR PERSHAD Vs. RAJKUMARI RUTTAN KOER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE facts which it may be necessary briefly to recapitulate, in order to make clear the grounds upon which their Lordships are about to decide this case, are as follows: Rani Asmedh Koer was the senior widow of Rajah Modhnarain Singh, and as such was entitled to a widow's interest in certain mauzas, part of the property of her deceased husband. She appears to have incurred debts to the appellant, and on the 1st March 1872 she executed a bond to him for the sum of Rs. 61,000 to meet the amount of her liability, and thereby hypothecated the mauzas. On the 31st August 1872 an agreement was entered into between her and Run Bahadur, whereby she surrendered her interest in her husband's estate to Run Bahadur, upon condition that he was to pay her an allowance of Rs. 24,000 for her maintenance, and was to pay off her liabilities. On the 31st March 1876 the appellant instituted a suit on the bond against the Rani and Run Bahadur, which was decreed by the Subordinate Judge on the 6th December 1876 in the terms of the prayer. The High Court varied this decree, and by their decree of the 2nd July 1878 held the Rani personally liable for the amount covered by the bond with interest thereon, and held the mortgage not to be binding upon the estate. The matter was brought before this Board by way of appeal, and in 1880 the appeal was dismissed. In 1884 the appellant sought to execute, against Run Bahadur and the properties in his possession, the personal decree obtained against the Rani, who was dead. The Court to which the application for execution was made held that the decree could not be executed against Run Bahadur, except in respect of personal property of the Rani, which had come to him on her death. The High Court on appeal upheld this decision by their judgment of the 14th January 1886. On the 13th January 1887 the appellant instituted the present suit against Run Bahadur, praying to have him declared liable, under the agreement of the 31st August 1872, to satisfy the decree obtained against the Rani on the bond.

(2.) THE first objection taken to the suit was that it was barred by the law of limitation.

(3.) BUT it is necessary for the appellant to satisfy this Board that the charge upon the estate was one which was binding upon it, and, bearing in mind the facts of the earlier suit, and what was said by the Board in that case, their Lordships are not satisfied that it was so binding in fact. In this view, the period of six years, and not the period of 13 years, applies in this case and the suit is consequently barred.