HIRALAL HARISINGH RAGHUWANSHI Vs. NIRBHESINGH CHHATARSINGH RAGHUWANSHI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE decision in this appeal will also cover Second Appeals Nos. 138 and 139 of 1941. All the appeals arise from the Hoshangabad district, and the same point of law, which is the only point argued here, iscommon to all. The appeals arise out of suits for arrears of agricultural rent brought by a landlord against his tenants. In the Hoshangabad district agricultural rents are payable on 1st May, and in each case, although the arrears were admitted, the defence was taken that no suit for the arrears of rent in a previous year lay since in a previous suit by the landlord for rent, which had been filed on 1st May, the rent for the year which fell due on that date had not been included, and therefore; by operation of Order 2, Rule 2, Civil P.C., the rent could not be claimed in this suit as it should have been included in the previous suit, and had not. The suit, out of which second Appeal No. 436 of 1939 arises, was filed on

(2.) ND August 1938 and it was contended that the claim for rent for the year 1936-37 could not be included as it should have been included in a previous suit for arrears of rent which was filed by the landlord on 1st May 1937. The suit out of which Second Appeals Nos. 138 and 139 of 1941 arise, were filed on 1st May 1939, and it is contended that no claim could lie for the arrears of rent for the year 1935-36, inasmuch as the claim had not been included in a previous suit instituted by the landlord for arrears of rent on 1st May 1936. It may be observed that the question of limitation does not arise, and the question for determination is the applicability of Order 2, Rule 2, Civil P.C., in respect of suits for arrears of rent. 2. The cases were tried originally by revenue officers sitting as civil Judges for the purpose of trying rent suits between agricultural landlords and tenants. These Courts concur, red in holding that the claim for the earlier years was tenable. In appeal, it was held in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Hoshangabad, in the case out of which Second Appeal No. 436 of 1939 arises, that the trial Court was correct, and the appeal was dismissed. In the appeal against the decision out of which the other two cases arise, it was held in the Court of the District Judge, Hoshangabad, that the decision in the trial Court was incorrect, and the claims for the year 1935-36 were disallowed. The result is that, of the appeals in this Court, one is by the tenant and two are by the landlord, although the point involved is exactly the same in each case. As the landlords are represented by the same counsel and the tenants are also represented by a single counsel, the reference in this case will be not to counsel for the appellant or for the respondent, but to counsel for the landlord and for the tenant. The relevant part of Order 2, Rule 2 runs as follows: (1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court. * * * Explanation.--For the purposes of this rule an obligation and a collateral security for its performance and successive claims arising under the same obligation shall be deemed respectively to constitute but one cause of action.

(3.) AS I have already stated, no question of the application of the Limitation Act arises here, and the provisions of the Limitation Act have no bearing on the question whether the claim for sammat 93 could or could not be included in a previous suit. The learned District Judge who held in favour of the tenants and held that the landlord should have included the claim for 1935-36, i.e., Sammat 92, in the previous suit which was brought on 1st May 1936, bases his decision on the following proposition: It is well known that cause of action arises on the date fixed for payment, either by statute or by contract, and a case of arrears cannot be certainly an exception to the general rule. It thus follows that the cause of action for rent arises on the date fixed for its payment and called as the due date. Now if a suit is filed for arrears of rent on the due date itself, i.e., on 1st May, it must include the maximum claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of rent, otherwise Order 2, Rule 2 would come in his way and would bar a subsequent suit for that portion which he was bound to include in the previous suit.