KALYANASUNDARAM AIYAR Vs. CHINNA GOUNDAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant obtained a decree against the respondents declaring that he held both the melwaram and the kndiwaram rights in certain land then in the occupation of the respondents. This decree became final on the 26 January, 1934, as the result of the decision of this Court in L.P.A. No. 12 of 1931. On the 22nd January, 1937, the appellant filed in the Court of the District Munsiff of Sankaridrug at Salem an application for an order in execution of his decree. The District Munsiff held that by reason of Section 6 of the Madras Estates Land Act, as it now stands, the application for possession of the property did not lie. This decision was challenged in an appeal to the District Judge, who reversed the decision of the District Munsiff. The respondents then appealed to this Court. The appeal was heard by King, J., who restored the judgment of the District Munsiff. This appeal is from the judgment of King, J., under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

(2.) On behalf of the appellant it is conceded that if the question is governed merely by Section 6 of the Madras Estates Land Act the appellant is not entitled to ask for possession of the property. It is, however, contended that by reason of the provisions of Section 127 (The reference is to Section 127 of Madras Act VIII of 1934 as subsequently amended.--Ed.) an application for possession does lie.

(3.) Sub-section (1) of Section 6 states that subject to the provisions of the Act, every ryot now in possession or who shall hereafter be admitted by a landholder to possession of ryoti land situated in the estate shall have a permanent right of occupancy in his holding. Three explanations follow. Only two need to be considered. The first explanation is to the effect that for the purposes of Sub-section (1) the expression "every ryot now in possession" shall include every person who, having held land as a ryot, continues in possession at the commencement of the Act. Explanation (2) states that the expressions "now" and "commencement of the Act" shall be construed as meaning the 30 day of June, 1934. The respondents were admittedly in possession on the 30 June, 1934.