KRISHNA CHANDRA SINHA Vs. EMPEROR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner has been convicted under Section 81(4), Defence of India Rule s, for an offence alleged to have been committed on 2 April, 1942 by selling two annas worth of rice to Balgobind Mistri at 5 3/4 seers to the rupee, whereas the controlled price was 7 1/16 seers per rupee and also selling one anna worth of rahar dal at 6 1/2 seers to the rupee whereas the controlled price was 8 seers to the rupee. He was sentenced by the Magistrate to a fine of Rs. 500 and on appeal the conviction was affirmed without entering into the merits on the ground that the appellant had pleaded guilty. Therefore the learned Sessions Judge said an appeal lies only on the question of sentence. The learned Judge was referring to Section 412, Criminal P.C., which bars an appeal except us to the extent or legality of the sentence when an accused person has pleaded guilty and has been convicted by a Magistrate of the first class on such plea.

(2.) In revision it is said that the petitioner pleaded not guilty and it is further contended that his confession of guilt, if at all it was a confession, cannot deprive the petitioner of the right of getting a wrong order set aside. Strictly speaking, in order to make Section 412, Criminal P.C., applicable the accused must have been convicted on his plea of guilty in exercise of the discretion of the Magistrate lander Section 255(2) of the Code. The judgment of the trial Court recites the evidence for the prosecution and the facts thereby proved as well as the substance of the accused's examination and his plea; but it does not make it quite clear whether the conviction is based on the plea or on the evidence or both.

(3.) I shall, however, assume that the conviction was a conviction on the plea within the meaning of Section 255 and proceed to examine the results which follow from that position. So far as the Court of Session is concerned to which appeals from convictions by a First Class Magistrate ordinarily lie, the learned Sessions Judge was justified in saying that an appeal to him lies only on the question of sentence. Now it is objected on behalf of the j Crown in the present case that similarly an application in revision to this Court is entertainable only on the same grounds on which an appeal was entertainable by the Court of Session. This argument rests on a reading of Section 439 of the Code in connection with Section 428. Section 439 empowers the High Court in its discretion to exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of appeal by Section 428 and the succeeding sections. Hence it is suggested that where in a particular case the powers of an appellate Court are restricted by Section 412 the powers of the High Court in revision are similarly restricted. The argument, it seems to me, loses sight of the provisions of Secs.413 and 414 and the consequences of those provisions.