(1.) Two questions have been argued in this appeal: first, that the suit is barred by limitation so far as the third defendant is concerned, and, secondly, that the payments made have been wrongly appropriated by the lower Court towards interest though they were made towards principal and interest without any specific appropriation to principal or interest.
(2.) The facts so far as they are material for the first question may be briefly stated. The promissory note on which the suit was brought was executed by the first defendant on her own behalf and as the guardian of her minor sons defendants 2, and. 3 who were members of an undivided Hindu family. Various payments were made by the first defendant from time to time and endorsed on the note, and the last of such payments was on 9 October, 1937. The suit was filed on 9 September, 1940. The second defendant who was the elder attained majority in 1930, and it was held by the lower Court that payments subsequently made by the first defendant could not bind him as valid acknowledgments or part payments and that accordingly the suit was barred by time as against him. But the Court held that as the Defendant 3 was still a minor, the payments by the first defendant who was the guardian of her minor son was a valid acknowledgment and saved the suit from limitation so far as he was concerned.
(3.) It is argued for the petitioner that this view is wrong as, after the second defendant attained majority, he became the manager of the joint family and he alone was competent to make valid acknowledgments or part payments so as to bind the Defendant 3, and that the Defendant 1 had no authority to do so as the liability of the third defendant was only in respect of his share of the joint family properties. It is well established law that in respect of a minor's interest in the joint family properties the manager of the family alone can bind the minor within certain well recognised limits, and that no guardian of property can be appointed or recognised. See Gharib-ul-lah V/s. Khaluk Singh (1903) L.R. 30 I.A. 165 at 170 : I.L.R. 25 All. 407 (P.C.) and Bindaji V/s. Mathurabai (1905) I.L.R. 30 Bom. 152. It is therefore difficult to see how the Defendant 1 could by her acknowledgment or part payment bind the Defendant 3 after 1930.