CHAMPAT UDEBHAN GOLE Vs. ISMAIL KHAN DULEKHAN MUSALMAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE question for decision in this appeal (no other ground being argued) is whether the plaintiff is entitled to exclude the period from 7th November 1936 till 4th March 1938 in virtue of Section 23, Debt Conciliation Act, for purposes of limitation.

(2.) THIS suit has been brought by Ismailkhan against the appellant on a promissory note and decreed by the first appellate Court. The appellant-defendant Champat applied to a Debt Conciliation Board for conciliation of his debts. He mentioned two creditors, Abdul Majid Khan and Suryabhan, but did not include the debt of the plaintiff-respondent Ismail Khan. On 7th November 1936, Ismail Khan made an application to the Debt Conciliation Board filing his statement of claim on the promissory note, saying that he had received no notice, and requesting to be included in the list of creditors and alternatively requesting that the debtor's application should be dismissed if the Board came to the conclusion that the debtor had suppressed the debt due to him. The agent of Abdul Majid Khan, who is a brother of the plaintiff-respondent Ismail Khan, was unwilling to conciliate the debt of his master unless the debtor would admit the claim of Ismail Khan. The Chairman of the Debt Conciliation Board stated in his order that he was not going to persuade the debtor to admit a claim which the debtor believed to be fraudulent (the debtor having said that the promissory note was obtained by fraud) and asked the debtor to produce the debt (whatever that might mean) and a copy of the notice alleged to have been given to the creditor and the stamp purchased to support his story of fraud. The proceedings continued until 4th March 1938. On that date the position was that the debtor did not admit the claim of the present plaintiff, that Abdul Majid Khan's agent refused to conciliate his master's claim as the debtor would not admit his brother's and that as the claim of the creditor Suryabhan did not form 40 per cent of the total claims there could be no conciliation.

(3.) I consider that this argument takes too narrow a view of the powers of the Debt Conciliation Board. Under Section 10 the Board had to endeavour to effect an amicable settlement and was to call upon the debtor and each creditor respectively to explain his case regarding each debt and endeavour to induce them to arrive at an amicable settlement. I consider that Section 10 gave the Board ample powers not only to enter into the merits regarding admitted debts, but to try and bring debtor and creditor to an agreement even in a case where the debt was denied. It must be borne in mind that either the creditor or the debtor was entitled to file an application and that creditors might prefer to arrive at a compromise and come in at the same time as other creditors rather than be put to the expense of bringing a suit. The low fees charged in Rule 19(2) were probably an attraction. Furthermore, as this case showed, the question as to whether a debt existed would materially affect the question as to