NAROTAM DAS Vs. EMPEROR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application in revision against the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge of Allahabad at Mirzapur partly allowing the appeal of one Narotam Dass who was convicted by the Munsif of Mirzapur on 5 January 1942 of an offence under Section 228, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 100 with 20 days simple imprisonment in default. The learned Sessions Judge reduced the fine to Rs. 50 but otherwise dismissed the appeal. The facts of this case are quite simple. The applicant was a defendant in a regular suit before the Munsif of Mirzapur. In his defence he had disputed the jurisdiction of the Court. The case came up on 3 October 1941 when the Munsif postponed the hearing of argument on this issue to 10 October. On that date, the Court decided the issue against the defendant holding that it had jurisdiction to try the suit. The applicant, Narotam Dass, took no steps of any kind for a period of more than two months. On 16 December 1941 he made an application in revision to this Court against the decision on the issue relating to jurisdiction. He did not at the same time make any application to this Court for stay of the proceedings in the Court of the Munsif.

(2.) The case came before the trial Court again's on 2 January, 1942 when Narotam Dass applied to the Munsif to postpone the case for two weeks to enable him to go to the High Court and bring a stay order. The Court, it seems, ordered that the case should come up on 5 January and that meanwhile the applicant should bring a stay order from the High Court if he so wished. On 5 January the applicant, Narotam Dass, it seems, brought no stay order but he filed an application to the Court for postponement of the case to enable him to move an application for transfer. The application contained a statement that the applicant was making the application for transfer because the Court had for some unknown reason become hostile to him. In effect the application was a statement that the Court had acquired a bias against the applicant by reason of which he would not be able to get a fair and impartial trial and that therefore he would move the District Judge for transfer of the suit to another Court. It was, of course, quite unnecessary for the applicant to include in his application this gratuitous and insulting statement that the Court had become biased. All that it was necessary for the applicant to say was that he desired a postponement because he proposed to move the District Judge to transfer the suit from the Court of the Munsif. The learned Munsif proceeded to take action at once against the applicant under the provisions of Secs.480 and 481, Criminal P.C. When called upon to make a statement, the applicant said that he had had no intention to insult the Court and in effect he pleaded not guilty to the charge. The Munsif however proceeded to convict him. The learned Sessions Judge after considering a number of cases stated his view thus: On reading the application No. 47 C I got the impression that this was added by Narotam Dass not because he wanted to move for a transfer, but because he felt himself aggrieved and wanted to tell the learned Munsif what he thought of him. It seems to me, therefore, that Narotam Dass a idea was clearly intentionally to insult the Munsif. I am therefore of opinion that his conviction is correct.

(3.) Learned Counsel has contended that there was really no proof of any intention to insult and he has relied on a number of cases for the proposition that the intention cannot be inferred from the mere words of the application and that the Courts should not be particularly sensitive in regard to the wording of applications of this kind which are made to them. I confess that I am not very strongly impressed with this latter contention. The mere fact that the Courts do not usually bother themselves very much or show themselves very sensitive to insulting language used in applications tends to the increase of the practice of importing insulting language into such applications and in the long run to an increase of contempt of Court and to a lowering of the dignity of Courts. It is the duty of persons who come to Court with applications to be careful about the language they use, and in the present case it has been pointed out that the applicant came to Court with his counsel and presented the application in person. In all probability had he consulted his counsel and presented his application through him, the language which found a place would not have been allowed to find a place. On the question of intention, it has been pointed out by Mr. Chandra, holding the brief of the Deputy Government Advocate, that when the applicant was taxed in the proceedings of the Munsif with this use of insulting language he merely said that he had not intended to insult the Court. He never suggested that he might be allowed to strike out the insulting language which he used in the application, although, if there was no such intention, that was the obvious course for him to suggest. Moreover, the absence of necessity for bringing in this charge indicates that it was an intentional act.