PUTHEN PURAYIL KRISHNAN Vs. UMKRISHNAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) On 6 November, 1939, the petitioner applied to attach a decree obtained against the 2nd respondent. Five days later, on 11 November, 1939, the 2nd respondent filed an application under the Debt Conciliation Act and notice was ordered to the decree-holder. On 20 December, 1939, the attachment of the decree was ordered. More than a year later, on 22nd January, 1941, an agreement was entered into under Section 14 (1) whereby the debt of the creditor was considerably reduced. When the petitioner put in an application to execute the attached decree, it was dismissed by the District Munsiff on the ground that the petitioner was not entitled to execute the decree; because such rights as the original decree-holder had against the 2nd respondent had been superseded by the agreement.

(2.) Under Section 14 (2) of the Debt Conciliation Act, an agreement entered into between a creditor and debtor has to be registered. It then takes effect as if it were a decree of a Civil Court and is executable as such. It does not supersede the decree of the creditor obtained by him in the Civil Court; but it presumably makes it impossible for the decree-holder to execute it; because the decree-holder would be met by the plea that he had entered into an agreement with the judgment-debtor that he would receive a lesser amount. No provision of the Debt Conciliation Act suggests that an order passed under Section 14 nullifies a decree passed by the Court. The decree therefore continues in existence. The agreement under Section 14 (1) is only an agreement and therefore binds only the parties to the agreement. The attaching decree-holder has the same right to execute that the original decree-holder had at the time of attachment.

(3.) I therefore hold that the decree can still be executed by the attaching decree-holder. I do not agree that that would be inequitable to the judgment-debtor. On the contrary, it would indeed be inequitable if an agreement entered into between the debtor and a person no longer interested in the decree were to bind a person who was not a party to the agreement. In the present case, for example, it is pretty clear that the application under the Debt Conciliation Act was filed and the agreement entered into in order to defeat the rights of the petitioner.