LAWS(PVC)-1942-12-18

SANASINTI SATRUGHANO PATRO Vs. KOTINI IGNESH MAHAPATRA

Decided On December 14, 1942
SANASINTI SATRUGHANO PATRO Appellant
V/S
KOTINI IGNESH MAHAPATRA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a judgment-debtor's appeal against concurrent decisions of the executing Court and the lower appellate Court that the Execution Petition No. 633 of 1940 filed on 2 August, 1940 by the respondent-decree-holders is not barred by time. The appeal raises a very short point, namely, whether a petition filed by the parties under Order 21, Rule 2, Civil P. C, on 10 October 1937 amounts to an acknowledgment of liability within the meaning of Section 19, Limitation Act. The relevant facts may be very briefly stated. The decree under execution was obtained on 11 November 1929. The first execution petition was filed in the year 1931, and was disposed of on 26 June 1933. The next execution petition was filed on 2 August, 1940 and is the one which is under consideration in the present appeal. There were certain payments towards the decretal amount, one of the payments being on 24 November 1934. These payments were referred to in the petition filed by the parties under Order 21, Rule 2, Civil P. C, on 10 October 1937. The petition dated 10 October 1937 is signed by the judgment-debtor. If this petition can be construed as an acknowledgment of liability within the meaning of Section 19, Limitation Act, then the execution petition filed on 2 August, 1940 is clearly within time.

(2.) As stated above, both the Courts have found that the petition or affidavit dated 10 October 1937 is an acknowledgment of liability within the meaning of Section 19, Limitation Act. After referring to the payments, the petition states that "both parties pray that payment of Rs. 1103 be recorded in part satisfaction." The actual words in Oriya are "ubhaya badinkara prarthana." There was some discussion before us as to whether the expression "ubhaya badinkara" meant "both parties" or "only the two plaintiffs." Both the Courts have taken the expression to mean "both parties." I see no reason why that meaning should not be accepted. The most important words in the petition are "in part satisfaction." These words clearly show that it was not merely the payment, which was being endorsed, but a liability was being acknowledged. Whether a particular endorsement does or does not constitute an acknowledgment within the meaning of , Section 19, Limitation Act must depend on its own terms. The learned advocate for the appellant relied on the case in Shyam Ballav Nandi V/s. Dolgobind Sahu A.I.R. 1942 Pat. 395. In that very case there is reference to an earlier decision Venkata Krishniah V/s. Subbarayuda A.I.R. 1917 Mad. 805, where the endorsement ran as follows: "Rupees 378 paid towards this document." It was held that the words "towards this document" amounted to an acknowledgment of liability within the meaning of Section 19. Similarly, I am of the view that the words "in part satisfaction" in the present petition amount to an acknowledgment oi liability. In that view of the matter, the appeal is without merits, and is dismissed with costs. Sinha, J.

(3.) I agree.