VADAKKUNNADHAN DEVASWAM UTAMA, HIS HIGHNESS THE MAHARAJA OF COCHIN, BY RECOGNISED AGENT THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF COCHIN Vs. PERALI KUNNATH TARWAD KARNAVAN AND MANAGER MADHAVA MENON

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant is the Secretary to the Government of Cochin in his capacity as jenmi of certain lands in British India, For these lands he obtained a decree for rent for the period from 1930 to 1935. The tenant filed two applications under Madras Act IV of 1938, one purporting to be under Secs.15 and 16 of the Act praying the Court to receive a deposit of the last two years rent and cancel the arrears embodied in the decree and the other purporting to be under Section 19 of the Act to record satisfaction of the decree by reason of the discharge to be ordered under the connected petition. The trial Court held that the deposit made fully discharged the arrears of rent for the two prescribed faslis and having accepted the deposit, it directed full satisfaction of the decree to be recorded. Against this latter order an appeal was filed before the learned District Judge who took the same view of the kanom document as that taken by the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. A second appeal has been preferred as against the appellate order under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code and a preliminary objection has been taken that no appeal lies-

(2.) The Full Bench in Nagappa Chettiar V/s. Annapoorani Achi , were concerned with an appeal from an order under Section 19 of the Act relating to a decree, for a debt. The learned Judges, held that the rule providing an appeal was ultra vires and that : the decision in Pakkiri Muhammad Tharaganar V/s. Syed Sahib , was right in so far as it holds that an order under Section 19 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act is not appealable under Section 47 of the Civil P. C., even though an execution application be pending at the time. It was pointed out that when dealing with applications under Section 19, the Court was not acting in execution, its function being merely to apply the provisions of the Act to decrees against persons who are entitled to relief under the Act. It has been argued by Mr. Venkatarama Sastriar for the appellant that this decision has no application; to the present case. We have on several occasions pointed out that Section 19 in terms applies only to a decree for the repayment of a debt and this does not having regard to the definition of debt in the Act include a decree for rent. We pointed out, however, in Ramadoss Reddiar V/s. Munuswami Reddiar , that a procedure analogous to that laid down in Section 19 has necessarily to be applied to decrees for rent in order to give effect to the provisions of Section 15 (1) of the Act which requires,that on the performance of certain acts rents outstanding on the date of the Commencement of the Act shall be deemed to be discharged whether the rent be due as such or whether a decree has been obtained therefor. One of us sitting separately has in Venkata Rajagopala Krishna Yachendm Bahadur Varu V/s. Venkata Seshachyrlu , following this decision,, held that an application for relief under Section 15 by the amendment or discharge of a decree for rent has to be made to the Court which passed the decree, as is the case with an application under Section 19. Another of us in an unreported case, A.A.O. No. 298 of 1940 has applied the principle of the Full Bench decision that the proceedings under Section 19 are not proceedings in execution covered, by Section 47 of the Code of Civil, Procedure, to proceedings under Section 15, with the consequence that no appeal lies from an order refusing relief under that section in the case of a decree.

(3.) Mr. Venkatarama Sastriar has argued that, whereas in respect of a decree for a debt a special procedure is laid down in. Section 19 for the amendment or satisfaction of that decree in accordance with the provisions of Act IV, no such procedure is laid down for a similar process in connection with decrees for rent in Section 15. He concedes that when under Section 19 a procedure has. been laid down without any right of appeal, it would be wrong, as the Full Bench has held, to graft a right of appeal on to that procedure either by rule or by treating the special procedure as one in execution. He contends, however, that under Section 15 the right is given but no procedure for implementing that right in the case of decrees is laid down, so that an aggrieved party is necessarily thrown back upon the ordinary procedure, which is the. procedure in execution and therefore he must necessarily get the executing Court to record satisfaction of the decree which is deemed to be discharged by the process contemplated in Section 15 of Act IV. That, no doubt, is a very arguable point of view, but it seems to us to run contrary to the line of decided cases relating to this Act. The view taken by the Full Bench clearly is that the statutory procedure for the amendment of a decree in order to give effect to the scaling down provisions is not a procedure in execution at all and that proceedings under the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act for the amendment of a decree or recording-satisfaction of a decree are independent proceedings to which Section 47 of the Civil P. C. can have no application. It would in our opinion be anomalous to hold that when the procedure explicitly laid down for decrees for debts is not a procedure in execution, the analogous procedure which we have approved for decrees for rent is a procedure in execution, and to hold so-would, of course, involve the consequence that the procedure in each case would have to be worked out not by the Court which passed the decree but by the executing Court, which is not the process contemplated by Section 19 Having regard to the cases cited, while recognising the possibility that a different view might have been taken from that which the Courts have taken, we feel constrained to hold that, a proceeding under Section 15 for the amendment or discharge of a decree for rent is not a proceeding in execution but a special proceeding under a special statute, and that, in the absence of any provision for a right of appeal, no appeal lies.