KANNEPALLI CHINNA VENKATA CHELAMIAH SASTRI Vs. MEDURU ANNAPOORNAMMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) When the judgment of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Udaypal Singh v. Lakhmi Chand (1935) I.L.R. 58 All. 261 (F.B.) and the judgment of the Privy Council in Rama Shah V/s. Lal Chand (1940) 1 M.L.J. 895 : L.R. 67 I.A. 160 : I.L.R.(1940) Lah. 470 (P.C.) are examined, it is quite clear that there is nothing in the judgment of the Judicial Committee to throw doubt on the long line of decisions of this Court referred to in Dosapati Ramayya v. Pattam Anjayya . The case of Rama Shah V/s. Lal Chand (1940) 1 M.L.J. 895 : L.R. 67 I.A. 160 : I.L.R.(1940) Lah. 470 (P.C.) had reference to Section 20 of the Limitation Act and there is nothing in the judgment which can be deemed to be by way of interpretation of Section 19, beyond the statement that Section 19, is not to be read as based upon the theory of implied promise. Section 19, applies to an acknowledgment of liability in writing and in deciding whether the words used constitute an acknowledgment, the Court can only have regard to the words used.

(2.) In the course of his judgment in Udaypal Singh V/s. Lakhmi Chand (1935) I.L.R. 58 All. 261 (F.B.) Sulaiman C.J., observed: It is equally obvious that where a payment is made without any specification and the debtor does not signify whether he is making the payment of interest as such or of part payment of the principal, there is really no admission on his part that any further sum is still due from him, and there is therefore no acknowledgment of liability on his part. We are in full agreement with this statement. If, for instance, on the back of a promissory note are written by the maker the words "paid Rs. 10", the endorsement cannot be construed as being anything more than a statement of the payment. The sum of Rs. 10, may constitute all which remains due in respect of the debt evidenced by the instrument. Where, however, the endorsement is, as it was in the present case, "paid Rs, 350 towards this promissory note and endorsed the payment. hereon, the position is altogether different. The use of the word towards in itself implies that more remains to be paid; in other words, that the payment is made on account of a larger sum due under the instrument. This amounts to an acknowledgment of liability within the meaning of Section 19 of the Limitation Act.

(3.) In the course of the judgment delivered by him in Dosapati Ramayya V/s. Pattam Anjayya , Wadsworth, J., referred to the line of cases of this Court on the question and stated that the judgment in Lutchumanan Chetty V/s. Mutta Iburaki Marakkayer (1869) 5 M.H.C.R. 90 provided an exception. This is not in fact the case. There tie endorsement consisted of these words "Rs. 50 paid", and the Court pointed out that the writing imported a simple payment of Rs. 50 and that oral evidence was not admissible to add to its meaning. The judgment in that case can only be regarded as being in conformity with the judgment in Udaypal Singh V/s. Lakhmi Chand (1935) I.L.R. 58 All, 261 (F.B.) and as we have already indicated the judgment in the latter case does not affect the question now before the Court. It is interesting to learn that four months after Sulaiman, C.J., had delivered the judgment in Udaypal Singh V/s. Lakhmi Chand (1935) I.L.R. 58 All, 261 (F.B.) he had to consider whether an endorsement in these words "Having paid Rs. 10 towards the amount due on the document I have made this endorsement" was an acknowledgment of liability within Section 19 and the learned Chief Justice held that it was. There is no essential difference between that endorsement and the endorsement which we are now considering. The later judgment of Sulaiman, C.J., was not reported but it is referred to in the judgment delivered by a Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Isri Prasad Tewari V/s. Chandrabum Prasad Tewari I.L.R. (1939) All. 200.