DURAISWAMI THEVAN Vs. KNKLLAKSHMANAN CHETTIAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The point raised by the appeal is, whether the alleged defamatory statement made by the defendant is absolutely privileged. Under the sections of the Madras Estates Land Act relating to the appraisement and division of the produce, the landholder (the plaintiff in the case) presented an application, and under Section 75 an officer was deputed to carry out the functions specified in that section. In the inquiry that followed, the defendant (who was a raiyat under the plaintiff) gave a long oral statement, and in the course of it, made the allegation (said to amount to slander) that the plaintiff had murdered his (defendant s) father- in-law. One of the pleas raised by the defendant in this connexion is, that he did not make the allegation imputed to him; but this point is concluded by the concurrent finding against him of the two Courts below.

(2.) The question of law is, as I have said, whether the statement is absolutely privileged. Mr. A. Srinivasa Ayyangar for the plaintiff (respondent) has strenuously urged that the proceeding before the officer deputed under Section 75 is not a judicial proceeding and that the rule of absolute privilege has no application. But the doctrine of absolute privilege is not confined to statements made before judicial tribunals strictly so called but has been carried further, and has been held to apply to statements made before a tribunal (which word covets a commission or inquiry) recognized by law, which, though not a Court in the ordinary sense of the word, exercises judicial functions, that is to say, acts in a manner similar to that in which a Court of justice acts in respect of an inquiry before it." Gatley on Libel and Slander, Ch. 11, p. 182, 1924 Edn. So long as the substantial elements of natural justice are observed, an absolute privilege attaches to the proceedings. The substantial elements of natural justice must be found to have been present at the inquiry." (p. 183).

(3.) The learned author points out that it is often a difficult question to determine, whether a particular tribunal exercises judicial functions so as to confer an absolute privilege on statements made in the course of its proceedings. In every case, he observes, it is necessary to examine somewhat narrowly the constitution, the functions and procedure of the tribunal. According to Folkard absolute immunity exists in respect of statements made "in the ordinary course of the administration of justice" or "in the usual and regular course of legal procedure," provided the statements made are relative to the matter in hand:" Folkard's Slander and Libel, Edn. 7, p. 100. Accordingly it has been held that a military Court of inquiry, though not coming within the ordinary definition of a Court of justice, is nevertheless a tribunal exercising judicial functions, so as to confer an absolute privilege on statements made before it. The General Medical Council, the Committee of the Law Society, a commission appointed by the bishop of a diocese, have similarly been held to be judicial tribunals within the meaning of the rule: Gatley: pp. 183 and 184.