DISTRICT BOARD OF FARRUKHABAD Vs. IKHLAQUE HUSAIN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This matter came before me first of all sitting alone, and I referred it to a Bench of two Judges, principally with the view to" take a more binding interpretation, than would be the case when I sit alone of Clause (c). Section 115, Civil P.C. It is a defendant's application in revision arising out of a suit by a plaintiff (a) for a declaration that the plaintiff was secretary of the District Board, and (b) for an injunction restraining the Board from interfering with the exercise by him of the duties of secretary. The plaintiff eventually withdrew his prayer for a declaration on an objection being taken that he had given no notice to the Secretary of State. The Munsif refused to grant a temporary injunction for which the plaintiff also asked. On appeal to the District Judge, that Court eventually gave the plaintiff a temporary injunction, and hence the defendant's present application in revision. The grounds are two-fold: first, that no appeal lay to the District Judge; secondly, that no temporary injunction should be given except in accordance with certain principles which were in effect stated to be capable of description as the principles applying to the grant of perpetual injunction. A third ground was pressed, largely no doubt in consequence of a suggestion made from the Bench, that there were some grounds for thinking that the learned Judge had not approached the case exercising a judicial discretion.

(2.) As to the first ground that no appeal lies the plaintiff's counsel in support of his right to file an appeal to the District Judge relies upon Order 39, Rule 2, Order 43, Rule 1(r), and Lachhmi Narain V/s. Ram Charan Das [1913] 35 All 425. I am satisfied that an appeal did lie. As to the second and third points, a preliminary objection was of course raised that no revision lies. I say "of course raised" because it is raised in perhaps three out of four of the cases before this Court on the revisional side, and it was agreed before me by counsel on both sides, and has been agreed in numerous other cases before me, that it is utterly impossible to reconcile the various rulings, even by this Court, on the subject. In considering the scope of Section 115, I think it is important to appreciate the meaning of the word "jurisdiction" for it is very frequently used as if it and the word "power" connote the same. I had occasion in another case to make a careful study of the scope of these words jurisdiction" and "power" and of the related phrases "Court of competent jurisdiction," "Court competent to try" and "not empowered by law," and I came to the conclusion, and I have not seen any reason to depart from that conclusion, that the characteristics of jurisdiction are merely: (a) power to deal with offences or matters of the class in question; (b) power to deal with persons of the class in question.

(3.) In some cases it has been suggested that the question of venue is also a determining factor of jurisdiction, but that is not the better opinion. The word "jurisdiction" has therefore in legal parlance a special signification though it is frequently used in judgments as if it connoted the same as power." Frequently the word "jurisdiction" is merely used loosely for "power" and the decision would be the same, if the word "power" were substituted. In other cases where a Court has found that a defect was so serious as to be normally incapable of remedy, it has been led to speak of the matter as if it was one of "jurisdiction." I may give a simple illustration of the distinction. A Court may have power to hear an appeal in a particular matter, and it may have power over the particular persons concerned, it has then jurisdiction to hear the appeal, but if it proceeds to allow the appeal without giving notice to the other side, it has here exercised a power not vested in it.