JOGENDRA MOHAN GUHA Vs. EMPEROR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The main facts of the case out of which this appeal arises are not disputed and are briefly as follows: The appellant, Jogendramohan Guha, was arrested in Sukea Street on 16 March 1932, in consequence of certain information which had been received by the police. Later in the day, he was taken to the house of his cousin, Babu. Lalitmohan Guha, at No. 2, Kalu Ghosh Lane, where he had been living for some time back and working as private tutor to certain members of the family in return for his board and lodging. He had been sharing a room with Lalit Babu's son, Haripada, and when the police were about to search this room, the appellant showed them a locked steel trunk, and told them that what they wanted was in that trunk. The key of the trunk was produced from a drawer under the direction of the appellant, and on the trunk being open a loaded revolver was found therein, concealed among some books and clothes belonging to the appellant. A note book (which is said to contain instruction and formulas for making bombs, though there is no evidence on this point), as well as a manuscript copy of a Bengali poem (said to be of a seditious character) were also found in the trunk along with the revolver. The appellant made no attempt to account for his possession of the revolver, which is an unlicensed weapon, and in all probability a smuggled weapon which never has been licensed.

(2.) On the above allegations, the applicant was, in due course, placed on his trial before a special Magistrate appointed under the provisions of Ordinance No. 11 of 1931, with the result that he was convicted under Section 20, Arms Act, and sentenced to six years rigorous imprisonment. The other occupant of the room, Haripada, was tried along with the appellant and was acquitted, the Magistrate holding that he had no knowledge of the contents of the appellant's trunk. Possession being admitted, the only question for determination in this appeal is whether the circumstances were such as to bring the offence within the mischief of the first part of Section 20, Arms Act, that is, whether the circumstances were such as to indicate an intention on the part of the appellant that his possession of the revolver should not be known to the police. It has been pointed out, on behalf of the appellant, that concealment at the time of search is specifically dealt with in the second part of Section 20 and it has been contended that the question for determination in the present appeal ought to bo whether the offence comes within the mischief of that part of the section, that the first part of the section does not apply to cases Where arms are found on a search being made under Section 25 of the Act. In my opinion there is no force in this contention. The two parts of Section 20 are quite independent of one another, and what we are concerned with in the present case is the character of the appellant's possession of the revolver prior to the time of the search.

(3.) In deciding this question, it has to be borne in mind that a revolver is not an ordinary weapon intended for purposes of sport or display, or for occasional use in the event of its possessor becoming involved in a fight, or something of that sort. It is intended for use at close quarters, and owing to its deadliness and to the ease with which it can be used and concealed, it is par excellence the chosen weapon of the murderer and the robber, and especially of the secret assassin. This being so, and especially in view of the severe restrictions imposed by the authorities on the possession of revolvers, there is, in the nature of things, a strong presumption that a person in unlicensed possession of such a weapon, who cannot or will not account for his possession thereof, has procured it for unlawful purposes, and has a fixed intention that his possession thereof shall not become known to those public servants, namely the police, whose duty it is to enforce the provisions of the Arms Act with a view to the protection of the ordinary private citizen and the law abiding public generally. Lest it be said that such a presumption would tend to place in jeopardy persons who have through carelessness, thoughtlessness or ignorance of the law, offended against the provisions of the Arms Act in respect of the possession of such weapons, it should be pointed out that the intention referred to in the first part of Section 20 is only one of the factors that would have to be taken into consideration in deciding what sentence would be appropriate in any particular case, and that it does not follow that a person who has been convicted under the first part of Section 20 will necessarily receive a heavier sentence than would have been inflicted on him under Section 19(f) of the Act.