ANTU NAVAJI SALUNKE Vs. YESHVANT BALA GAIKWAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The facts of this appeal are simple. They raise a point of Hindu la V/s. The plaintiff, who was the adopted son of one Bala, sued to Bet aside an alienation made by Bala's widow Jija in favour of her son-in-law defendant No. 1. The facts necessary for the disposal of the appeal are that Bala died leaving a widow Jija and two daughters Chandra and Ganga, of whom Chandra was married to defendant No. 1. She died in 1915. In 1920 Jija and Ganga, the next reveraioner, both passed a deed of gift in favour of defendant No. 1. Exhibit 17, dated June 4, 1920. In 1926 Jija quarrelled with defendant No. 1, and took the present plaintiff in adoption on June 1, 1926. The plaintiff sued to set aside the alienation to defendant No. 1. The first Court dismissed the suit on the authority of Hem Chunder Sanyal V/s. Sar-namoyi Debi (1894) I.L.R. 22 Cal. 354 and Chinnaewami Pillai V/s. Appaawami Pillai (1918) I.L.R. 42 Mad. 25. On appeal, the decree of the lower Court was Reversed by the Assistant Judge of Satara on the ground that there could not be any surrender by the widow in favour of a total stranger like defendant No. 1, and he, therefore, awarded the plaintiff's claim. The defendant has made this second appeal, and two points were raised. The first was that the adoption of the plaintiff was not proved, because it was not shown that there had been giving and taking, which is a necessary formality even among Shudras, and, secondly, on the ground in law that the surrender of Jija in favour of defendant No. 1 of the whole estate could be supported.

(2.) The first point may be disposed of in a few words. I have read the depositions. Jija says she took the plaintiff on her lap after asking his natural father to give him in adoption. The father says he gave him, and in the absence of any cross-examination on the point, I take it that the necessary ceremony of giving and taking has been performed.

(3.) As regards the second point, although various cases have been quoted by the learned advocates on either side, the matter is very simple, and certainly covered by the case on which the learned Assistant Judge has relied, viz., the well-known Privy Gounoil case of Rangasami Gounden V/s. Nachiappa Gounden, s.c. L.R. 46 I.A. 72. It is necessary to draw a distinction between an alienation by a widow consented to by the reversioner, which is regarded as proof of legal necessity, and a case like the present where there is a surrender by the widow of the whole estate in favour of the next reversioner. That distinction is drawn in the case referred to, Rangasami Gounden V/s. Naohiappa Gounden. The headnote begins by saying- As to the power of a Hindu widow to deal with the property of her hug-band to which she has succeeded for a life-estate on his death, there is a dis-tinotion between the power of surrender or renunciation, which is the first head of the subjeot, and the power of alienation for certain specific purposes, as necessity, which is the second.