(KODUKULLA) KAMAYYA BHUKTAH Vs. (KODUKULLA) CHINA SOORANNA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The parties are Velnadi Brahmins of the Andhra Country. Defendant 3, the widow of one Lakshmi-narayana Bhakta, adopted defendant 2, the son of defendant 1, her husband's first cousin (paternal uncle's son). The plaintiff who is another first cousin (another paternal uncle's son) of har husband brought this suit for a declaration that the adoption was invalid on two grounds: (1) that the plaintiff's consent to the adoption which was necessary was not given ; (2) that the adopted son's Upanayanam had been performed in his father's family and that such adoptions are not valid among Brahmins of this class.

(2.) The District Munsif decided both points in favour of plaintiff and gave him a decree. The learned Subordinate Judge decided both points against the plaintiff and dismissed the suit. The plaintiff appeals. On both points the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge is clear and complete and I entirely agree with his reasoning. It is therefore not necessary to elaborate the points at length.

(3.) As to want of plaintiff's consent, it is found that when he was asked for it, his reply was Ex. 2 in which he said that he would not give his consent because he had a reversionary interest in the property of the deceased. This he expanded in his evidence when he said that he did not give his consent because he was the nearest heir and would lose a share. On the authorities this refusal was highly improper based as it was on plaintiff's own selfish interests and not on anything connected with the propriety of the adoption: Ganesa Bathna. maiyer v. Gopala Bathnamaiyer (1878) 2 Mad 270, Venkatarama Baju V/s. Papamma AIR 1915 Mad 759 and Krishna Bao v Bajah of Pittapur AIR 1927 Mad 733. The refusal of consent was therefore rightly disregarded. But it is now objected that in defendant's request for consent, the name of the boy to be adopted was not mentioned and dissent on such a request cannot be treated as an effective dissent. Authorities were referred to to show that a general assent of kinsmen to an adoption in the abstract will not do; but there must be assent to the adoption of a particular person. These authorities are beside the point. Had the plaintiff put his inability to consent on the ground that he did not know which boy was to be adopted his present complaint may have force in so far as his failure to Consent was. due to a reasonable cause. But by his actual answer be disclosed that his dissent was not based on any considerations of the adoptee's unsuitability, but due to his own unwillingness to forgo his reversionary interest. No question therefore arises as to the identity of the adoptee in connexion with plaintiff's consent and it is Sufficient to say that by his answer plaintiff put it entirely beyond his power to complain of the adoption on the ground of want of his own consent.