DISTRICT BOARD Vs. BAIJNATH PRASAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal arises out of a suit for money on account of work done by the plaintiff for the defendant. The plaintiff is a building contractor and he obtained certain contracts from the defendant, namely the District Board of Allahabad, for the construction or repairs of certain buildings. The last of the works was completed sometime in December 1927. The contractor submitted his bill sometime in January 1928 and the bill was scrutinised by the District Board sub- overseer, who did not admit that the sums claimed were correct and made certain deductions. The plaintiff persisted in his demands and even sent registered notices to the District Board from time to time demanding payment of the sums claimed. The matter was under consideration of the Board for some months. The final notice sent by the plaintiff was dated 2 March, 1929, and after the expiry of two months the plaintiff instituted his suit on 16 May 1929.

(2.) One of the principal defences to the suit was that the suit was barred by limitation by virtue of the provisions of Section 192, District Boards Act, 1922. Under Sub-section (3), it is laid down that no action such as is described in Sub- section (1) shall be commenced otherwise than within 6 months next after the accrual of the cause of action. We have omitted certain words which are irrelevant for the purposes of the present suit. It may be open to argument whether actions described in Sub-section (1) apply only to suits arising out of tortious acts or whether they apply also to suits arising out of contracts. It is unnecessary for us to consider that point and we will assume for the purpose of argument that this section does apply also to actions against District Boards arising out of contracts. The trial Court gave effect to the defendant's plea and held that the suit was barred by limitation but passed a decree for a certain sum which the District Board admitted to be due. The plaintiff appealed to the learned District Judge, who took a contrary view on the question of limitation and held that the suit was within time and decreed the plaintiff's suit for the sum of Rs. 2,131-8-0 together with interest pending the suit. The defendant comes to this Court in second appeal and the principal point argued was that of limitation.

(3.) The appellant's contention is that the period of limitation for a suit of this nature is governed primarily by Art. 56, Schedule 1, Limitation Act, which gives a period of three years from the time when the work is done. He argues that the effect of Section 192, Sub-section (3) District Boards Act, is to substitute a period of six months for the period of three years laid down in the Limitation Act but that the starting point for limitation should be the same. As it is necessary under Sub- section (1) of Section 192 for a plaintiff when suing the Board to give notice of his intended suit two months before instituting the suit, this period of two months must be added to the terms of six months mentioned in Sub-section (3) so that the period of limitation would be eight months from the date of the completion of the work. If this contention is accepted then obviously the suit is barred, because the work was completed in December 1927 and the suit was not instituted until 16 May 1929. We are not prepared to accept the appellant's argument on the question of limitation. Under Sub-section (3) of Section 192 the period of six months runs from the date of the accrual of cause of action. The date of the accrual of the cause of action in a suit of this kind is not necessarily the date when the work was completed. For instance, it might be agreed between the parties that payment was to be made for work done within six months after the completion of the work. In such a case it could not be held that the plaintiff had a cause of action until the expiry of six months after the completion of the work. In view of the language of Section 192, Sub-section (3), District Boards Act, we have to look to the date of the accrual of the cause of action. It appears from the terms of the contract itself that this date cannot be taken as equivalent to the date of the completion of the work because in accordance with the terms of the contract itself it is provided that after the work has been completed the contractor is to submit his bill and this bill is to be scrutinised by the officers of the District Board and after scrutiny and acceptance it will be paid. It is obvious therefore that the contractor could have no cause of action until after the scrutiny of his bill by the District Board servants, and this scrutiny might take a considerable time.