POORNANANTHACHI Vs. TSGOPALASWAMI ODAYAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application for an extension of time by two months for furnishing security for costs. Leave to appeal to the Privy Council was granted on the 16 October, 1931, and the petitioner was directed under Order 45, Rule 7 of the Civil P. C. to furnish security for costs of the respondent within six weeks from the date of the granting of the certificate. The last day for furnishing security was the 27 November, 1931. By that date the petitioner had been unable to furnish the security and on the 30 November, 1931, she presented this petition praying for an extension of time by two months.

(2.) The petition is supported by the affidavit of the kariasian of the petitioner. The two reasons for the granting of the petition set out in that affidavit are: (1) the inability of the petitioner to furnish the security owing to her difficulty in getting the necessary funds, and (2) because the petitioner is an old widow and for the two months previous to the presentation: of the petition had been ill and confined to her bed. With regard to the former reason, it is stated that the sum awarded by the Appellate Court to the petitioner for her maintenance, namely, Rs. 175 per mensem, is hardly sufficient for her maintenance and that the sum of Rs. 2,500 which she drew from the Lower Court was utilised to pay off sundry creditors and that with the strictest economy she had only been able to save Rs. 1,500 and had not been able to raise the balance of Rs. 3,000, the amount of the security ordered. It is also stated on her behalf that after this petition was filed her advocate tendered to the Registrar the full amount of the security ordered but that, as the time for furnishing it had expired, the Registrar refused to eceive it and that the money is now in the hands of her advocate awaiting the disposal of the petition. The agent of the guardian of the minor 5 respondent has put in a counter-affidavit in which it is denied that the petitioner had been ill and confined to her bed for two months and the deponent states that he had occasion to meet her during the time when it is alleged she was ill and that she was in good health. It is also stated that the petitioner drew from the Receiver in the Lower "Court Rs. 10,919-11-0 under the order of that Court, dated the 11th November, 1930, and that the allegation that she discharged debts is false. It is also pointed out that the judgment of the High Court in the appeal was delivered on the 1 May, 1930, that the application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council was filed on the 2nd December, 1930, and that leave to appeal was gsanteS on the 16 October, 1931. It is; also stated that when leave was applied for it was claimed for the petitioner that as the decree of this Court reversed the decree of the Lower Court and the value of the appeal was more than Rs. 10,000, she was entitled to leave as of right. It is also alleged that the application for leave to appeal was really a move to obstruct the final decree proceedings of the Lower Court and that the real object was to get a stay of the decree of this Court. No stay was obtained, however, and the partition and division of the property was proceeded with. In an affidavit in reply to this counter-affidavit sworn to by ,the petitioner she denies the allegation in the counter- affidavit that she was in good health and further states that the money received by her from the Lower Court was in fact used for other necessary purposes, namely, payment of debts incurred for her maintenance for several years and the expenses of the litigation.

(3.) Taking the matters deposed to in these affidavits, it seems to me clear that this petition must fail upon the merits and that no extension of time should be granted to the petitioner. With regard to the petitioner's alleged ill-health she has made no attempt, and none has been made on her behalf, to substantiate this allegation. She merely contents herself with repeating it in her reply-affidavit. There is no certificate by her medical attendant, if shte had one, and she does not even state that she had. Nor is there any affidavit by any independent person in support of her allegation. With regard to her inability to raise the necessary funds, that is not a ground in my view for granting" an extension of time particularly after such a long time has elapsed since the decree; and it has been held in a number of cases that this alleged reason is not sufficient to justify any extension of time for furnishing such security. In my view, therefore, on the facts, this petition must be dismissed.