SHER PAL SINGH Vs. MTAIJAZ FATIMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a defendant's appeal arising out of a suit for rent. The plaintiff originally was one Abdul Karim Khan and he claimed for himself and on behalf of 7 other persons the rent due from the defendant first set in respect of the 15 his was share belonging to the plaintiff and the persons he represented. Defendant 4, Sheo Baran Singh, was joined as pro forma defendant upon the allegation that he was lambardar and entitled under the terms of an agreement between the parties to collect the rent of the remaining 5 his was share. The suit was resisted on a great number of grounds which we need not set forth in detail for the purpose of this appeal. The trial Court dismissed the suit but the lower appellate Court has taken a different view and has decreed the major portion of the plaintiff's claim. To understand the facts in dispute, it is necessary to give a brief history of the property in suit. In 1915 a 15 his was share of the village was sold to Ghulam Mohiuddin Khan and Rashid Ahmad Khan. The plaintiff and 7 others whom he represented are the representatives of the purchasers. In 1916 Sheobaran Singh and Hardeo Singh, who were cosharers in the village, sued for pre-emption and the suit was decreed on 26 September 1916. Sheobaran Singh paid up the whole of _ the preemption money and thus obtained possession of the 15 biswas. On 13 March 1920 the High Court reversed the pre-emption decree, restoring the title of the original purchasers. The latter regained possession and Sheobaran Singh withdrew the pre-emption deposit. The case went up to their Lordships of the Privy Council and on 22 March, 1927 the Privy Council reversed the decree of the High Court, restoring the decree of the Court of first instance. On 8 April 1927, Sheobaran deposited the pre-emption money and regained possession.

(2.) This suit was instituted by Abdul Karim, on behalf of the representatives of the purchasers, for the rent of the years 1332 to 1334-F. One of the defence to the suit was that Abdul Karim Khan was not entitled to sue alone but was bound to join all the representatives of the original purchasers. This objection is based upon the provisions of Section 266, Agra Tenancy Act, but Sub-section (1) of that section shows that the cosharers can appoint an agent to act on behalf of them all. Abdul Karim claimed to be acting as agent on behalf of them all and the objection is of no importance now, since Abdul Karim died during the pendency of the suit, and upon his death, the remaining representatives of the original purchasers were brought upon the record as plaintiffs. They expressly stated in their application, for being impleaded as plaintiffs, that Abdul Karim Khan was acting for them as the collector of rents. There is therefore no force in this objection.

(3.) Another point raised for the appellant is that Abdul Karim Khan and his cosharers had no authority to collect rent in respect of the 15 biswas share in the village. The plaintiff based his right upon an agreement arrived at between all the representatives of the purchasers on the one hand and Sheobaran Singh as lambardar on the other hand. It appears that after the decree of the High Court which resulted in the suit of Sheobaran being dismissed, the purchasers applied to have Sheobaran Singh removed from the post of lambardar and one of themselves to be appointed. The parties came to a compromise in the lambardari case to the effect that Abdul Karim Khan and his vendee cosharers will realise the rent of the 15 biswas share and Sheobaran Singh will realise as lambardar the rent of the 5 biswas share. An arrangement was also made regarding the arrears of rent due from tenants.