(1.) These four appeals have arisen out of four apportionment cases dealt with by the Land Acquisition Judge of 24-Parganas under Section 30, Land Acquisition Act. The claim of the appellant for being awarded the compensation in respect of a ganti interest has been disallowed and hence these appeals. There are cross-objections in connexion with three of these appeals, the same being directed against the compensation, which has been awarded to the appellant on account of his proprietary interest in the touzi. The facts are quite simple. The ganti consists of the lands of a certain village named Rahara, which appertains to seven amalgamated touzis, of which touzi No. 188 is one. The respondents were the owners of the said touzi and were also gantidars in the lands of the said village, having a three annas gantidari interest under their touzi No. 188. For arrears of revenue defaulted on 28 March 1925, the touzi was sold on 18 September 1925. In pursuance of a declaration, dated 11th December 1924, some lands were acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. In respect of the lands concerned in Appeals Nos. 146, 147 and 148 the Collector made his awards and took possession on 16 September 1925, and as regards the lands of Appeal No. 149) he did so on 22 December, 1925. In the awards so made, certain amounts were awarded to the respondents as proprietors of the touzi, and some further amounts were awarded to them for their gantidari interest. The appellant, after his purchase at the revenue sale, applied to the Collector on 3 October 1925, for a reference praying to be allowed all the amounts so awarded. The Judge, as already indicated, awarded the compensation for the proprietary interest to the appellant and that for the gantidari interest to the respondents.
(2.) Some argument has been addressed to us on behalf of the appellant to establish that there was no ganti under touzi No. 188, and that the ganti, that there was, was under the other six touzis or some of them. We think the existence of three annas ganti interest under touzi No. 188 has been established beyond doubt, and indeed its existence was not a matter disputed in the Court below. As regards all the appeals, the substantial contention, urged on behalf of the appellant, is that he is entitled to the entire compensation for the lands, that is to say the amounts awarded both to the proprietors and to the gantidars, because, under Section 28, Revenue Sale Law (Act 11 of 1859), his title as purchaser dated back to the date of the default and, as such purchaser, he annulled the ganti at the earliest possible opportunity. On behalf of the respondents, it has been urged, so far as Appeals Nos. 146, 147 and 148 are concerned, that, inasmuch as before the sale these lands had been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act and so lost to the touzi, what the appellant purchased was not the touzi, but the touzi minus the acquired lands, and consequently he was not entitled to get either of the amounts awarded as compensation. In the aforesaid appeals as well as in Appeal No. 149, a further argument was advanced on behalf of the respondents, namely, that what was said in the petition of the appellant of 3 October 1925, was not sufficient to annul the ganti. Now, Section 15, Land Acquisition Act, says that in determining the amount of compensation, the Collector shall bo guided by the provisions contained in Secs.23 and 24.
(3.) Under Section 23(1), Clause 1, the market value at the date of the publication of the declaration under Section 6 has to be taken, and under Section 24, Clause 7, any outlay, for improvements or disposal since that date, but without the Collector's sanction, is not to be regarded. These sections, however, only lay down rules for determining the market-value and do not create any right on the part of the owners of the lands or the holders of interest therein to obtain compensation on the footing of their respective rights as at the date of the declaration. In the case of Surja Kanta Acharjya V/s. Sarat Chandra Roy AIR 1914 PC 82, the Judicial Committee observed that, on the failure of an owner to pay the Government assessment, his estate or interest in the land is forfeited, or rather determined, and that, under such a sale, what is sold is not the interest of the defaulting owner, but the interest of the Crown subject to the payment of the Government assessment. The same view has also been expressed by their Lordships in the case of Narayan Das V/s. Jatindra Nath And under Section 28 and Sch. A, Revenue Sale Law (Act 11 of 1859), the title of the purchaser is to be deemed to have vested in him on the date of default. But, as observed by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of Shyam Kumari V/s. Rameswar Singh (1904) 32 Cal. 27 at p. 39: When the Act is considered as a whole it seems clear that when a sale or purchase is spoken of in connexion with time, the time meant is that at which the sale takes place in fact, not that to which its operation is carried back by relation.