(1.) In disposing of A.S. No. 372 of 1926 the learned Subordinate Judge in my view has confounded two entirely different issues. In para. 6 of his judgment he proposes to himself the question whether the plaintiff's claim is cognizable by a civil Court, which is the subject matter of issue 6. He then goes on to discuss what the claim amounts to and appears to be deciding the question whether the plaintiff has established a right to require the gods to be stopped at his house, which is the subject matter of issue 2, though he concludes by finding that the right claimed by the plaintiff is not cognizable by a civil Court. I must take it that he has restricted himself to a consideration of issue 6 and that he has left issue 2 undecided.
(2.) The case upon which he seems to have relied on in his somewhat confused discussion is Krishnaswami Ayyangar V/s. Rangaswami Ayyangar (1909) 5 IC 76. There is no doubt that the brief passage in the judgment which is relevant upon this point concludes with the observation that the suit is not of a nature of which a civil Court can take cognizance. But the grounds given for coming to that conclusion are in the first place that the right claimed to stop the idol in front of the plaintiff's house is not part of the right to worship by a member of the community for whose benefit the temple has been dedicated, which, I think, must be regarded as a finding upon the merits of that particular case; another finding of the same description is that there can be no right to obstruct a highway for the purpose connected with the plaintiff's claim. I find it difficult to understand how the cognizable character of the claim can be decided on grounds such as these. It is unnecessary to canvass this case further because, in my view, the Privy Council case in Manzur Hasan V/s. Muhammad Zaman , which the learned Subordinate Judge dismisses as having no reference to the circumstances with which we are now dealing, is clear authority, as the learned District Munsif has taken it to be, that a claim by a person to exercise a right of worship is a claim of a description cognizable by a civil Court. Their Lordships have made reference to the differing views taken by the High Courts of Bombay and Madras and have expressed a preference for the Madras view, upheld by Calcutta, that a suit of this character is cognizable by a civil Court. Their Lordships were dealing with the right to conduct a religious procession through a public street; but their decision sets at rest the more general question, whether a claim to conduct or to participate in public worships is actionable. There can be no doubt that, whether it be well or ill-founded, the plaintiff's claim, is one so to participate and I think it is quite clear accordingly that issue 6 in the suit must be answered in plaintiff's favour.
(3.) The learned District Munsif, who has decided all the issues, has given the plaintiff a decree with reference to the two deities, Gangai Amman and Ponni Amman, which formed the subject matter of A.S. No. 372 of 1926 before the Subordinate Judge. The learned Subordinate Judge has not proceeded to consider the other issues with the exception of one, namely, issue 7, on the question of non-joinder. The point here raised was that the villagers as a body constituted the trustees of the affairs of these deities, that the defendants in obstructing the plaintiff acted as such trustees and that it was necessary either to implead all the villagers or to bring a representative suit in order that an operative decree might be passed. The single case upon which the learned Subordinate Judge in accepting this contention has relied upon is Haran Sheikh V/s. Ramesh Chandra AIR 1921 Cal 622.