RAGHUNATHDAS HARJIVANDAS Vs. DISTRICT SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) A preliminary point is taken by the learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondent, the Secretary of State, in this appeal that no appeal lies.

(2.) The appeal relates to the apportionment of compensation for certain land acquired in Nasik, and it is contended that under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act no appeal will lie against an order passed in respect of the apportionment of compensation in a reference under Section 30 of the Act. The learned Assistant Government Pleader has based his argument first on the fact that under Section 39 of the old Act there was a distinct section referring to the right of appeal against an order apportioning compensation, which does not exist in the present Act, and secondly on the ruling of the Privy Council reported in Ramchandra Rao v. Ramchandra Rao and it is contended that the Privy Council have held in that case that the term "award" can only include an order regarding the amount of compensation to be paid for the land acquired and that any order regarding apportionment amongst persons interested is not an award. At p. 970 of that judgment it is stated as follows :- The award as constituted by statute is nothing but an award which states the area of the land, the compensation to be allowed and the apportionment among the persons interested in the land of whose claims the Collector has information, meaning thereby people whose interests are not in dispute, but from the moment when the sum has been deposited in Court under Section 31 (2) the functions of the award have ceased ; and all that is left is a dispute between interested people as to the extent of their interest. Such dispute forms no part of the award...

(3.) On a careful examination of the judgment of the Privy Council, however, it does not appear that any decision was arrived at that no appeal lies from the decision determining the rights of various rival candidates to the whole or part of the award. The point which arose before the Privy Council in that case was of a different nature, and, although the order determining the apportionment of the compensation is not, in view of the Privy Council ruling, an award within the meaning of Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, that only means that it is not governed by the provisions regarding appeal contained in the latter part of that section. It does not mean that there is no appeal against it. Even in the judgment under reference the Privy Council says (p. 970) :- ...it would indeed bo strange if a controversy between two people as to the nature of their respective interests in a piece of land should enjoy certain rights of appeal which would be wholly taken away when the piece of land was represented by a sum of money paid into Court.