(1.) In my view there should be absolutely no difficulty in administering the provisions of Section 145 nor in dealing on the revisional side of this High Court with any orders that may have been passed under Ch. 12. The difficulty only arises in the Courts of Magistrates because possibly owing to pressure of work they do not read Section 145 carefully. In the present case though I propose to pass an order under Section 145, I shall have to vary the order passed by the Magistrate, because he did not read the section and pass his order in accordance with its terms. On the other hand in my opinion difficulty has been created even in this Court, if I may say so with respect to other learned Judges, by a failure to appreciate the difference between jurisdiction to entertain a matter and the power to pass particular orders in that matter. I may illustrate this immediately. The present case has been referred by the learned Sessions Judge to this Court because no order was passed by the Magistrate strictly conforming to the terms of Section 145(1). The learned Judge has considered that he has been directed by certain decisions of this Court to hold that where an order has not been passed precisely in the terms of Section 145(1) the Magistrate had no " jurisdiction " to proceed. I have been referred to the cases of Dan Prasad V/s. Ganesh [1913] 14 Cr.L.J. 495, Nathu Ram V/s. Emperor [1917] 18 Cr.L.J. 557 and Banlce Singh V/s. Gokul . In the first two of those cases the word " jurisdiction " was specifically used. In the third case the word " jurisdiction " was not used. In my view the omission to draw up an order under Section 145(1) has nothing whatever to do with the question of "jurisdiction" at all. I had the occasion in another place to make a careful study of the scope of this word, and I come to the conclusion and I have had no reason to depart from that conclusion that the characteristics of a Court of competent jurisdiction were : (a) power conferred to deal with offences or matters of the class in question, (b) power conferred to deal with the offenders or persons of the class in question.
(2.) In some cases it has been suggested that the question of venue is also a determining factor of jurisdiction, but the better opinion is to the contrary. That question does not arise at any rate in the present case.
(3.) In the present case there can be no question whatever that the Magistrate had power to deal with the matter in question and with the persons in question, and he had therefore jurisdiction in the case.