KAMESHWAR SINGH BAHADUR Vs. RAMJIWAN SAHU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal from a decision of the District Judge of Bhagalpur affirming a decision of the Munsif in the following circumstances: The plaintiff in the suit is the Maharajadhiraja of Darbhanga who sued the defendants for arrears of rent and interest. He obtained a decree for Rs. 483 with interest until realization. He put this decree into execution and the decrial amount together with costs and interest up to the date fixed for the sale on 22 December, was Rs. 599. The judgment- debtors came into court with an application that the plaintiffs be ordered to accept a sum of Rs. 200 and that the sale might be postponed till February. To this application the plaintiff agreed and the sale was accordingly adjourned until the month of February. On 13 February the judgment-debtors again came into court with another part payment of Rs. 125, but this time the plaintiff objected to any further postponement of the sale. Nevertheless the Munsif did in fact order against the ex-press wish of the plaintiff an adjournment of the sale until 2 April, on which date the judgment-debtors paid up the balance of Rs. 274. Thereupon the plaintiff having obtained a decree for the decrial amount with interest up to the date of realization claimed that he was entitled to the amount of interest upon the sum outstanding against the defendants between the dates of 23 December and 7 April, 22 December, being the date when Rs. 200 was paid and 7 April being the date of the final payment. In view of the decree he was clearly entitled to this sum.

(2.) It is true that the actual sum of interest is only Rs. 5-15-6 which in itself is entirely inconsiderable; but the plaintiff is right in stating that his claim is a matter of principle which if decided against him would have a very severe effect in many other cases, The attitude of the Munsif was to call attention to the fact that the decree-holder had on the first occasion accepted part payment and had voluntarily agreed to the postponement of the sale, and he seems to imagine that having made this agreement it entitled the Munsif to postpone the sale on future occasions and at the same time, whether or not the plaintiff consented, to deprive him of the interest to which he was entitled under the decree. This principle cannot be accepted for a moment. When the matter went before the learned District Judge on appeal, he made a mistake of a more serious character which requires emphatic correction. He drew attention to the fact that the plaintiff was a wealthy landlord and that the defendant was a minor and said that he could not imagine that such a wealthy man could wish to harass his tenant for such an extremely small sum. Incidentally he also agreed with the erroneous reasoning of the Munsif and he said that in these circumstances he was not prepared to set aside the Munsif's order and re-open the execution case and inflict further harassment upon the judgment-debtors for the sake of a petty sum like Rs. 5-15-6 and ended with the legal maxini de minimis non curat lex.

(3.) That maxim in the first place does not apply to the circumstances in the least. The relative wealth of the plaintiff and defendant is utterly immaterial to the decision of this matter and moreover the smallness of the sum involved does not involve the application of the maxim, for it frequently happens, as has clearly happened in this case, that a very small sum may involve a very big question of principle which may affect other cases. Furthermore a fundamental mistake has been made by the Munsif and by the District Judge in disregarding the form of the decree behind which the executing Court is not entitled to go. The form of the decree was that the plaintiff was entitled to the decrial amount together with interest to the date of realization and the order of the Munsif and the District Judge is a simple decision that they will not give the plaintiff that to which he has been held entitled and they in effect alter the decree passed in his favor. I regret that it should be necessary to call attention to such elementary principles of justice but this case has necessitated it. The appeal is accordingly allowed. We may say in conclusion that we have been informed by the learned Advocate on behalf of the plaintiff that it is not the intention of the plaintiff to put the decree into execution for this small amount, but it is necessary to draw attention to the fact that that matter has not influenced us in the very slightest in making this order because it is a principle that the court has no right to demand generosity from a party at a term for giving him his legal rights. Fazl Ali, J.