(1.) The appellant in this case is the widow of Raja Saroda Narain. The respondent is the nearest male agnate of the deceased, being the son of one Nilkantha Narain, the original plaintiff in the suit, who was the son of Bharath Singh. The proceedings were instituted for the purpose of establishing the title of the plaintiff to an estate known as the Serampore Raj or Gadi and certain moveable and immoveable property, cash and securities which had been purchased out of the income of that estate. The questions with regard to the estate and the monies and property representing the investments from this income are distinct, and need to be separately considered. They have both been decided adversely to the appellant, with the exception of the claim to certain Government securities which will be more specially referred to hereafter. Serampore Raj or Gadi is impartible, and the family is governed by the Mitakshara law. If there had been no division of the family the property would have passed to the plaintiff but it is asserted that Bharath Singh separated from his father in his life-time, and that consequently neither he nor the plaintiff was joint in estate with Raja Saroda Narain.
(2.) Now, the facts upon which this alleged separation is based have been concurrently found by the two Courts and are no longer the subject of dispute. The argument properly open to the appellant is not upon the facts themselves, but that these facts, when accepted, do establish separation. The facts are these : The village of Chow rah was granted, at a date not precisely ascertained but many years ago, by the then Raja to the plaintiff's father Bharath Singh by way of maintenance on a mokurari grant at a nominal rent. The plaintiff's father, who died in 1879, does not appear to have gone to reside at Chowrah, but the plaintiff wont there about 1885, when the then Raja was a minor and his estate was under the management of the Court of Wards, The effect of this change of residence necessarily effected a reparation in food and mess. T The High Court hold distinctly that there was no separation in religion, and the learned Subordinate Judge holds that there was no separation beyond the separate living in the maintenance village and the consequent separate messing.
(3.) The cases of Girja Bai V/s. Sadashiv Dhundiruj (1916) L.R. 43 I.A. 151 and Kawal Nain V/s. Prabhu Lal (1917) L.R. 44 I.A. 159 are clear decisions that it is competent to a member of a joint family to separate himself from the family by a clear and unequivocal intimation of his intention to sever, and this is also true with regard to an impartible estate ; but as in that case the parson separating forfeits his chance of inheriting the whole of the estate by survivorship, it requires strong evidence to establish such saparation.