(1.) This case is an instance of the appallingly protracted litigation in this country which has been recently described by the Privy Council "as a disgrace to any civilised community". The money in dispute was left by will by a large] number of legacies, some of them of small amounts, to persons in humble positions. The plaintiff sues as assignee of some of the larger legacies. The testatrix died in in 1899 and, assuming the money in dispute to have been disposable by will by the testatrix, there was enough to pay all legatees, but up to now nothing has been paid to any of them; and those who are still alive and can be traced are now told that they will not receive anything until this case has been once more to the Privy Council, for the case has been brought before us with documents prepared in the form of a Privy Council appeal, and we have been told by the defendants that our views on the subject are only being taken in passing. I venture to hope that other counsels may prevail and this litigation has at last come to an end, for, in my view, the defendants have no sort of merits on their side and no sort of defence to the action.
(2.) The facts are fully set out in the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, but I think it is necessary for me to recapitulate them shortly so far as they are relevant to the present dispute. In 1892, the boy known as the Medur minor, whose father had died in 1888 but whose mother, Venkayamma, known as the Medur Rani, the testatrix, was still alive, was adopted by Papamma Row, the widowed Rani of Nidadavole. The Medur minor died in 1895, still a minor and unmarried. Litigation at once began between his mother and his adoptive mother as to whether the adoption was legal or illegal, each claiming a widow's estate in the Medur property, which up to the time of his death was being administered by the Court of Wards, and after his death either by the Court of Wards or by Court Receivers. A large sum of money representing the income of the Medur Estate, and including the income arising between the death of the minor and the death of the testatrix which took place in March 1899, was paid into a Bank to the credit of the Subordinate Judge in whose Court the litigation between the widows was then pending. Shortly before the testatrix's death she made a will in favour of some of the plaintiffs and persons who have assigned their rights to the first plaintiff and others. An executor was named in the will but he did not act and died shortly after the testatrix. The pending litigation was continued by the fathers of the present defendants who were the paternal uncles of the Medur minor and claimed, on the basis that the adoption was bad, to succeed to the testatrix as the heirs of the Medur minor and his father. On December 2, 1899, the Subordinate Judge held that the adoption was good and that, therefore, Papamma Row succeeded to him. On December 5, 1899, Papamma Row died. Her heirs were the 1 plaintiff and the two uncles of the Medur minor referred to above, who happened to be closely related to the Nidadavole Rajah as well as to the Medur Raja. On the death of Papamma Row, the 1 plaintiff filed a suit for partition and he claimed, on the basis that the adoption was valid, one-third of the Medur estate, and he also became a party to the pending appeal as a representative of Papamma Row. But the uncles on the other hand, on the basis that the adoption was bad, claimed half each. It is to be remembered that, if their contention was right, the testatrix had a Hindu widow's estate in the Medur property from the time of the death of the minor until her own death. In 1903 the District Judge held the adoption to be invalid. Everyone appealed and the cases were heard together and in November 1905 the High Court of Madras held that the adoption was valid, The position then was that the testatrix had no interest in the money in Court and the 1 plaintiff and the two uncles divided the Medur property including the money in Court as heirs of Papamma Row. The uncles and the 1st plaintiff then applied to the Court for payment out of the money and, notice having been given of appeal to the Privy Council, they, all being men of position and means, were allowed to take the money out giving bonds that they would return it if the Court so ordered. Owing to what seems to be most unreasonable delay on the part of the parties, it took no less than 9 years before the case was disposed of by the Privy Council. Their Lordships reversed the decision of the High Court and held that the adoption was invalid, and the present appellants, who are the sons and representatives of the uncles, who had meanwhile died, were held entitled to divide the Medur Estate. They had said nothing to the Privy Council about the testatrix's will and so they got a decree for the whole estate including the money in Court. They knew perfectly well all about the will all the while; in fact, their fathers had been litigating about some jewellery which was the private property of the testatrix and had been disposed of by her under that will and had themselves put forward the will, which they said they disputed, as one ground why neither of them should have the custody of the whole of that private property; and execution proceedings in that suit were being continued against the present defendants as late as 1916.
(3.) As between the parties to the Privy Council appeal, the defendants were entitled to the money, and that is all their Lordships had before them and all that their Lordships decided or intended to decide. There is no reason to think that the defendants were acting in any way improperly or dishonestly in saying nothing about the will, and, in my view, they must be held to have taken what was given by the judgment on the terms that they would hold so much of it as passed under the will of the testatrix as her representatives, if the will was good and the property hers but would take it for themselves if, as they were about to allege, either the will was invalid or she had no power of disposal over the money.