ABDUL LATIF USMAN Vs. HAJI TAR MAHOMED

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal from the order of Mr. Justice Kanga refusing to grant sanction which was applied for by the defendant in Suit No. 2600 of 1920. The sanction to prosecute was asked for in respect of a letter dated 16 October 1920 (Exh. E), which was said to have been forged and also in respect of a statement made by respondent No. 1 as regards the settlement of the July shipment which was a matter in dispute between the parties. It is not necessary for the purpose of this appeal to state in detail the facts relating to the suit. The suit was decided on the 9 August 1920, when it was conceded by the plaintiffs that there was a settlement in respect of the July shipment.

(2.) An objection has been taken on behalf of the respondents that no appeal lies because the subordinate Court contemplated by Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, is a Court other than a High Court and that therefore there could be no appeal under that section from the order of a Judge of the same Court. It seems to me however, that the preliminary objection must be disallowed. Sub-section (7) of Section 195 provides that for the purpose of this section every Court shall be deemed to be subordinate only to the Court to which appeals from the judgment of that Court ordinarily lie. In the present case there could be no doubt that under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent appeals would ordinarily lie from the judgments of a single Judge exercising Original Civil Jurisdiction to this Court, that is the Court of Appeal on the Original Side. It is true that generally speaking the subordinate Court contemplated by Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, is a Court different from the Court to which the appeals would ordinarily lie. But, having regard to the words of the section, it seems to me clear that for the purpose of Section 195, the Court from whose order the present appeal is preferred is a Court from whose judgment an appeal would ordinarily lie to this Court: and therefore the present appeal asking us to grant the sanction and to revoke the order refusing to grant, the sanction is competent. It may be, though it has not been suggested, that Sub- section (7) really provides for the three classes of cases mentioned in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of that sub-section. I do not think, however, that those specific provisions are restrictive of the general rule contained in that sub-section defining subordination for the purpose of Section 195. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to decide, whether, apart from Section 195, an appeal would be competent under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. As at present advised, I doubt whether an order refusing to grant a sanction to prosecute under Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, is a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15. I base my decision on the preliminary objection upon the terms of Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code.

(3.) [His Lordship dealt at this point with the merits of the appeal, and continued:- ] I am satisfied that the circumstances which have been fully stated by Mr. Velinkar are entirely insufficient to justify our disturbing the order made by Mr. Justice Kanga.