LAWS(PVC)-1922-9-55

SHRIDHAR LAXMAN DHEKNE Vs. JANARDHANBAPUJI KURAWDE

Decided On September 28, 1922
SHRIDHAR LAXMAN DHEKNE Appellant
V/S
JANARDHANBAPUJI KURAWDE Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) We are hearing this case in second appeal, and two points have been argued before us. The first is as to the effect of the conveyance by Krishnaji to the plaintiff of 23 September 1915. (Exhibit 71). Counsel for the defendants Nos. 2 to 4, who are the appellants, contends that on the true construction of the document, merely one-third of Ramachandra's one-quarter share passed, and not the whole of that one-quarter share. We have carefully considered this document, and we are of opinion that the decision in the Court below as to the effect of this document is correct, namely, that the entirety of that one-quarter passed to the plaintiff.

(2.) Originally, undoubtedly, Ramachandra had conveyed this quarter to Kashinath in 1883 by Exhibit 66. Kashinath had conveyed it by Exhibit 83 to Krishnaji in 1896. But by a document of 1904 (Exhibit 72) one Govind as survivor of himself and Gopal had purported to convey a two-thirds share in this quarter to the plaintiff on the hypothesis that Krishnaji acquired this quarter share for the benefit of himself and his joint brothers, Govind and Gopal. Turning next to Exhibit 71 under which the plaintiff also claims, this document refers to the conveyance by Govind (Exhibit 72,) and in the view I take it really confirms it. The effect of Exhibit 71 is, in my opinion, that there is an absolute conveyance of one-third of one-fourth, and a confirmation and conveyance of the remaining two-thirds which had previously been conveyed by Exhibit 72 by Govind to the plaintiff. I am quite satisfied that the intention of the parties was that the entirety of the quarter should vest in the plaintiff. That, in my opinion, is the effect of this document, and accordingly this point will be decided in favour of the respondent.

(3.) Then, the next point is this that the defendants contend that the conveyance of 1896 by Kashinath to Krishanaji (Exhibit 83) was not duly registered in accordance with the requirements of the Registration Act., From the endorsement it appears that this document was presented at the office of the Sub-Registrar on the 3 September 1896, and it is signed as "Krishnaji Ramchandra on his behalf Ramchandra Vithal." In other words, Ramchandra, the father of Krishnaji, presented the document for registration. Now, no doubt, the Indian Law is very strict, and rightly so, having regard to the danger of forgery, in seeing that the requirements of the Indian Registration Act are strictly complied with and nothing in what I am going to say is intended in any way to depart from the well- established authorities on these points. Counsel for the appellants, conceded, and I think rightly so, that if the document had been signed by Ramchandra as agent for his son Krishnaji, then the Act would prima facie have been complied with and it would then be for the defendants to establish if they could, that the requirements of the Act were not in fact complied with. But, in my opinion, there is no substance in that point. Whether a man signs expressly as agent or whether he is expressed to sign on some other person's behalf that, in my opinion, makes no substantial difference. In each case he signs prima facie as agent. Accordingly, in the view I take, prima facie the document complied with the requirements of the Indian Registration Act, and, therefore, it was rightly admitted in evidence. It appears that in fact no objection whatever was taken to this document until after the evidence was closed and indeed until after Counsel's arguments were finished. The result was that no evidence was led by the defendants to negative the prima facie conclusion as to the validity of registration. Under these circumstances, I agree with the learned Judges in the Courts below that this document was duly registered and that it was rightly relied on in the lower Courts. This disposes of the two points raised by the defendants in Second Appeal No. 704 of 1920.